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Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking  
Amnon Lehavi† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Can a court commit a wrong? Could it be viewed at times 
as violating the legal rights of litigants, and of citizens more 
broadly, in rendering a decision? More specifically, can a court 
infringe on constitutionally protected rights the same way that 
a legislature or an administrative agency might, and if so, what 
should be the consequences of such a violation?  
In some instances, the answers to these questions would be 
straightforward enough or generally negligible. When a court 
abruptly ignores the required legal process by, for example, ar-
bitrarily refusing to hear the arguments of one of the parties, 
when it rules in a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, or 
when it makes a decision by tossing a coin, the infringement of 
the litigant‘s rights would follow from the fact that the court 
exceeded its authority, violated the due process of law, and so 
forth. In some other cases, we may say that the court was clear-
ly erroneous in its decision, although we should not necessarily 
contend that it has committed a wrong in the sense of violating 
a party‘s legally enshrined rights.1 This would be so, for exam-
ple, when a superior court disagrees with the way in which a 
lower court interpreted a certain statutory provision. Such a 
flawed ruling would simply be reversed by the higher court, 
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 1. See Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1787, 1817–27 (2005) (noting that not every reversal necessarily implies 
that the lower court committed a judicial wrong). Extreme abuses of discretion 
would trigger the thought that the judge has grossly exceeded the boundaries 
of his legitimacy, but ―to denounce a judicial act as illegitimate typically ex-
presses a strong condemnation. Virtually no one would characterize every 
judicial ruling reversed on appeal as legally illegitimate.‖ Id. at 1817–18.  
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regardless of whether we view the judicial act as constituting a 
―wrong.‖2  
There are many other cases, however, in which the ques-
tion of whether judicial action constitutes a violation of rights 
is a complex and ambiguous one. These cases nevertheless have 
major potential consequences. This arises especially when the 
court can be viewed neither as exceeding its authority or acting 
arbitrarily, or as being merely incorrect about a certain point of 
law. It is then that the question of a ―judicial wrong‖ comes to 
the forefront.  
In the recent decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, four of the 
eight participating U.S. Supreme Court Justices seem to have 
dramatically broadened the potential scope of judicial wrongs.3 
They did so by formulating a new doctrine of ―judicial taking,‖ 
while at the same time deciding that no such taking had oc-
curred in the present case.4 According to this opinion, ―if a leg-
islature or a court declares that what was once an established 
right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that 
property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated 
it or destroyed its value by regulation.‖5 In a concurring opin-
ion, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg left ―for another day‖ the 
question as to whether a judicial decision could amount to a 
taking.6  
Thus, under this tentative new doctrine, when a state court 
of last resort dramatically reforms state property law, with 
such a shift resulting in a systematic reallocation of property 
rights and duties, this ruling might violate the Fifth Amend-
ment‘s Takings Clause.7 This would be so even if the court was 
                                                                                 
 2. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed 
from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 636–43 (1971) (differentiating between 
primary and secondary judicial discretion). Primary discretion endows the 
trial judge with a ―wide range of choice as to what he decides . . . .‖ Id. at 637. 
Secondary discretion deals with ―hierarchical relations among judges,‖ when-
ever the system prescribes the degree of finality and authority a lower court 
enjoys, so that in some cases a trial judge would have a ―right to be wrong 
without incurring reversal.‖ Id. But even when reversal is at stake, so that a 
wrong decision would be overturned, this does not entirely undermine the de-
cision-making legitimacy of the trial judge. See id. at 641 (―A trial court de-
termination that is discretionary . . . has a status or authority that makes it 
either unchallengeable, or challengeable to only a restricted degree.‖). 
 3. 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597–613 (2010). 
 4. Id. at 2612–13. 
 5. Id. at 2602. 
 6. Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 7. Id. at 2602 (plurality opinion); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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authorized to act in view of the allocation of powers among the 
state‘s institutions, if such a doctrinal shift is not prohibited by 
the state‘s constitution and statutory law, and if the court me-
ticulously followed procedural due process rules in its decision 
making.8 Under this approach, the identity of the branch of 
government committing the constitutional violation does not 
matter.9 For this purpose, says Justice Scalia, writing for the 
plurality, the state court is viewed as just another state actor.10  
The main argument advanced in this Article is that such a 
jurisprudential approach may have dramatic, if unintended, 
consequences regarding the role of courts as lawmakers and 
state actors. Accordingly, this approach may redefine the role of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in overseeing law-reforming decisions 
by state courts in matters dealing primarily with state law, but 
which also raise a federal constitutional question. In many re-
spects, the approach suggested by Scalia brings up issues that 
have remained largely unanswered since the seminal Court 
decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer11 and New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.12  
In Shelley, the Court struck down a state judicial decree 
that upheld a privately drafted racial covenant forbidding the 
sale of the property to non-whites.13 The state court based its 
decision on state common law principles and the private nature 
of the dispute.14 The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that since 
the state court is a ―state actor‖ in its own right, then by ren-
dering a judgment upholding the covenant, the state court‘s 
decision has implicated, and violated, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment‘s Equal Protection Clause.15 
In the aftermath of Shelley, courts and commentators have 
dealt mainly with the way in which this decision would blur the 
distinction between private and public law.16 This focus has 
also dominated the legacy of Sullivan, in which the Court sub-
                                                                                 
 8. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602.  
 9. See id. (―[T]he particular state actor is irrelevant. If a legislature or a 
court declares that what was once an established right of private property no 
longer exists, it has taken that property . . . .‖). 
 10. Id. 
 11. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
 12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 13. 334 U.S. at 20. 
 14. Id. at 19. 
 15. Id. at 16–22; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 16. For an overview of Shelley and its implications, see discussion infra 
Part I.B. 
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jected state common law libel to constitutional scrutiny and 
imposed limits on damages for public officials in libel actions, 
in order to preserve the First Amendment‘s guarantees of free-
dom of speech and the press.17 Beyond the development of this 
new doctrine, the chief jurisprudential discourse that evolved 
in the aftermath of Sullivan concerned the way in which this 
decision established a ―horizontal application‖ of constitutional 
norms to private legal disputes.18  
But the focus of this Article is quite different, as are the 
lines that it wishes to draw between Shelley, Sullivan, and 
Stop the Beach. This Article examines key insights that these 
cases may provide for evaluating the institutional role of courts 
within the system of government. This implicates not only the 
relationships among courts and legislatures or administrative 
agencies, but also among different types of courts: one acting in 
the capacity of a judicial lawmaker, and the other serving as a 
judicial reviewer. In so doing, this Article delineates an innova-
tive theoretical framework for addressing potential frictions 
within the judiciary that occur whenever the federal reviewing 
court is asked to examine an alleged constitutional wrong 
committed by the lawmaking state court.  
This Article is structured in four Parts. Part I analyzes the 
complex evolution of the concept of courts as being both law-
makers and state actors. It starts with a concise survey of the 
competing views of courts as either ―law-finders‖ or ―law-
makers.‖ It then moves to discuss the depiction of courts as a 
state actor and the nontrivial implications that such an analy-
sis had in the Shelley case. It argues that although the Shelley 
ruling has been practically abandoned with respect to the ―con-
stitutionalization‖ of private conduct, its state-actor reasoning 
nevertheless leaves open some intriguing dilemmas about the 
institutional role of courts and the constitutional review of 
their action. This Part concludes by briefly analyzing current 
constraints on judicial lawmaking by state courts. It discusses 
both internal limits implicated by intra-state separation of 
powers doctrines and external limits stemming from potential 
intervention by lawmaking federal courts.  
                                                                                 
 17. 376 U.S. at 265–66, 279–83.  
 18. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional 
Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387, 434–47 (2003) (arguing that Sullivan estab-
lishes a strong version of ―indirect horizontal application‖ of constitutional 
norms to private law disputes, so that while private actors have no direct con-
stitutional duties, all laws, including private law rules, could be subjected to 
constitutional review).  
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Part II analyzes the recent Stop the Beach case. After dis-
cussing the differences of opinion between the groups of Justic-
es about the doctrine of judicial taking, this Part seeks to iden-
tify the broader jurisprudential features of the decision. Some 
of these issues have been explicitly addressed by the Court. 
This is so, for example, for the debate between Justice Scalia 
and Justice Kennedy concerning the possibility of constraining 
the power of a state court to dramatically change property 
rights by holding that such a change would violate the Due 
Process doctrine. The two Justices also debate whether recog-
nizing a ―judicial taking‖ could be seen as potentially expand-
ing the power of courts to effect such dramatic changes, in the 
sense that the law-changing decision would remain valid sub-
ject to the payment of ―Just Compensation.‖19  
Many other issues have been left untouched by the Court, 
despite their potential dramatic implications. For example, al-
though Justice Scalia sees courts as just another state actor for 
purposes of the Takings Clause,20 and all Justices seem to ac-
knowledge the fact that courts engage in the creation of law, 
none of the opinions discuss the extent to which courts should 
be viewed more broadly as state actors engaged with setting 
legal policy.21 Specifically, none consider whether courts should 
be granted more, less, or the same level of deference by the Su-
preme Court, as compared with other branches of government, 
when their norm making is being challenged as violating feder-
al constitutional rights.22  
Part III takes up this challenge. Assume that, within a cer-
tain state, a court is considered, from a separation-of-powers 
viewpoint, as legitimately engaging in lawmaking and policy 
making in a certain field of law. This is so, for example, when a 
court revises the doctrine of adverse possession by eliminating 
the requirement that the possession has to be continuous for 
the statutory period, an element that had been established in 
its previous case law.23 In so doing, the state court reasons that 
such a reform is mandated by the fact that in the contemporary 
era, landowners have better information about potential en-
                                                                                 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.A.  
 20. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010). 
 21. See id. at 2592–619. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 120–22 (7th ed. 2010) 
(discussing the broader contours of this doctrine). 
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croachments, and that there is a growing societal need to use 
lands efficiently.  
Or, consider another scenario in which a state court revises 
the doctrine of the right of redemption, rooted in historic judi-
cially designed equity ideas.24 The court reasons that with the 
change of times, this right is now often being abused by home-
owners who fail to pay their mortgages when house values go 
down and resume doing so only when the market goes up 
again, even if this happens only after they formally default on 
their mortgage. In light of this, the court decides that the doc-
trine would now generally apply only to homeowners who live 
below the federal poverty line or who own no other real proper-
ty. A defaulting debtor denied the right of redemption based on 
the new criterion contends that the ruling not only takes her 
property under the Fifth Amendment, but also violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause. Again, as-
sume that such a reform is considered legitimate from the 
state‘s viewpoint on separation of powers.  
When such state judicial decisions are brought before the 
U.S. Supreme Court on the argument that they violate the 
plaintiff ‘s federal constitutional rights, should the Court see 
the case as a conventional ―vertical‖ intra-judicial matter, and 
in appropriate cases say that the state court was wrong as a 
matter of law? Or should it engage in the ―classic‖ type of judi-
cial review, as if it were examining a legislative or administra-
tive provision?  
The latter approach would be based on the view of courts 
as law-makers and not merely as law-finders, but would never-
theless raise an additional set of questions. For example, 
should the Supreme Court as judicial reviewer defer to the 
state court‘s discretion as lawmaker and policy maker to the 
exact same degree that is does for other branches of govern-
ment? And should there be a difference in the Court‘s policy to 
a judicial reform in a pure common law doctrine vis-à-vis an 
innovative judicial interpretation of a state statutory provision?  
Part IV suggests a potential way out of the tautologies and 
institutional quagmires that may haunt the adoption of an ex-
pansive ―judicial review of judicial lawmaking‖ model. The sug-
gested blueprint starts with the argument that in contempo-
rary legal systems, the judicial development of law is almost 
                                                                                 
 24. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 577, 583–85, 590–604 (1988) (examining the history of this doctrine and 
related policy considerations). 
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always being done against a background of legislative or ad-
ministrative ordering, even in traditional common law doc-
trines. Adverse possession, for example, is a longstanding mix-
ture of statutes and case law. This Part identifies the choice 
that legislatures and executive bodies often make between 
promulgating norms as either hard-edged rules or as open-
ended standards, and how such a choice implicates the future 
development of law by judicial norm making. It argues that the 
dynamic need for gap filling of vague or lacking provisions legi-
timizes judicial lawmaking, while at the same time maintain-
ing the original nexus to the statute or administrative provi-
sion. Consequently, most potential cases of ―judicial wrongs,‖ 
including ―judicial taking‖ ones, can be reconceptualized as 
judicial innovations that are nevertheless based on a legislative 
or executive mandate and reviewed accordingly.  
While such an approach would not entirely eliminate the 
possibility of a ―judicial wrong‖ scenario, it would definitely 
scale it down. Accordingly, this jurisprudential approach would 
significantly ease the tension involved with the potential un-
dermining of the nature and structure of the judicial branch. It 
would strengthen the constant dialogue among the different 
branches of government within each state system, and make 
better sense of the federal structure and the interpretation of 
the U.S. Constitution. In so doing, the legal system would be 
better able to address the constant need for the progress of law 
in the modern administrative State, while minimizing unin-
tended implications that may undermine the delicate balance 
between government‘s decision making institutions.  
I.  THE COURT AS LAWMAKER AND STATE ACTOR   
This Part examines, first, the intricate history of courts as 
―law-makers‖ and not merely as ―law-finders.‖ While this legal 
reality has typified Anglo-American courts for centuries, it was 
probably only at the turn of the twentieth century that juri-
sprudential discourse started analyzing this phenomenon ex-
plicitly and systematically. This Part then ties the lawmaking 
trait of courts to their depiction as state actors, a viewpoint 
that led to a groundbreaking result in Shelley and to heigh-
tened controversy in its aftermath.  
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A. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING IN THE  
COMMON LAW 
Courts in the English common law tradition, and conse-
quently in the American system, have always engaged in devel-
oping the law against the tension of rhetoric and practice.25 
Judges and early English legal thinkers emphasized ―historici-
ty as the source of authority of the common law‖ judicial enter-
prise.26 In rendering their decisions, judges looked to the an-
cient law of the land, dating back to time immemorial.27 As 
J.G.A. Pocock argues, early seventeenth-century thinkers such 
as Sir Edward Coke employed this concept against the back-
ground of the political power struggle in England.28 The con-
cept of an ―ancient constitution,‖ allegedly dating back to the 
days before the Norman Conquest, served the goal of restrain-
ing extensive powers claimed by the King.29  
―At the same time, common lawyers exalted custom as em-
bodying the results of judicial efforts to improve the law over a 
long period of time, resulting in what Coke dubbed the common 
law‘s ‗artificial reason.‘‖30 This reliance on custom explains the 
English practical tendency ―to read existing law into the remote 
past.‖31 The common law thus constantly looked both backward 
to history and precedents, and forward to allow common law 
rules to develop so as to meet the changing needs of society.32 
The extent to which this backward-forward nature of the com-
mon law was authentic or merely a pretext for granting judges 
more power to design the law remains contested, but it is clear 
that in practice, English common law courts have been con-
stantly engaged in judicial lawmaking.33  
                                                                                 
 25. See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 551 (2006) (outlining the history of the common law tradition). 
 26. Id. at 581.  
 27. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL 
LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CEN-
TURY 37 (1957) (―But by Coke‘s time the increasing activity of a nearly sov-
ereign monarchy had made it seem to most common lawyers that if a right 
was to be rooted in custom and rendered independent of the sovereign‘s inter-
ference it must be shown to be immemorial . . . .‖). 
 28. Id. at 31–32. 
 29. See id. at 51–53.  
 30. Meyler, supra note 25, at 585.  
 31. POCOCK, supra note 27, at 31.  
 32. See Meyler, supra note 25, at 588. 
 33. See id. at 588 (arguing that Edward Coke developed the idea of what 
she terms ―common law originalism,‖ by which ―reliance on precedents fur-
nished a certain kind of authority, yet prior case reports themselves might not 
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This pattern has also typified the development of the com-
mon law in the American colonies, and later in the United 
States. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams aimed at tracing the 
―true‖ common law to the ancient English past,34 but at the 
same time, the common law has constantly developed in a dif-
ferent fashion among the various colonies and later among the 
various states.35 It was probably, however, only with the writ-
ings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and the twentieth-century 
legal realists that the concept of common law judges making 
law, and not merely discovering it, became explicitly en-
trenched in American jurisprudence.36 
This lawmaking function has been recognized as taking 
place in a multitude of settings, such as when judges create 
new doctrines in traditional common law areas, construct a 
doctrine against the background of a largely indeterminate sta-
tute, or engage in the interpretation of ―capacious‖ constitu-
tional language.37 Maybe most instructive is Justice Scalia‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
provide satisfactory reasons for particular outcomes,‖ so that ―reading, re-
reading, and interpretation were essential‖).  
 34. See id. at 567–71 (explaining how Jefferson dated the ―true‖ common 
law to the era before the Magna Carta and how Adams dated the ―true‖ com-
mon law to the ―ancient constitution‖).  
 35. See id. at 575 (―The treatment of the common law—and divergences 
therefrom—in the early states further substantiates the founding generation‘s 
recognition that regional common law in America deviated in parts significant-
ly from the English model.‖). This has also implicated the more general query 
about the stability or dynamism of the judicial enterprise. Several authors, 
including Justice Antonin Scalia in his opinions and academic writings, have 
relied on William Blackstone‘s Commentaries on the Laws of England and 
other texts to argue that the common law around the time of independence 
was viewed as fixed, stable, and unified. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 
451, 472–78 (2001) (Scalia J., dissenting); see also Antonin Scalia, Common-
Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts 
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9–12 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (―It is only 
in this century, with the rise of legal realism, that we came to acknowledge 
that judges in fact ‗make‘ the common law, and that each state has its own.‖). 
However, a multitude of other sources point to the fact that not only was the 
common law constantly evolving both in England and in the young United 
States during that time, but also that a significant level of dynamism and de-
velopment was recognized as a legitimate component of the judicial role within 
the emerging American system of law. See generally Meyler, supra note 25, at 
567–80 (discussing the view that judges have taken license to change and up-
date the common law throughout American and English history). 
 36. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
883, 886 (2006) (noting that with the rise of legal realism, it ―is thus no longer 
especially controversial to insist that common law judges make law‖). 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 886–88 (discussing various methods by which judges 
create common law doctrines).  
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statement in his Stop the Beach opinion, which stated that at 
the time that the Constitution had been adopted, ―courts had 
no power to ‗change‘ the common law,‖ but as of the nineteenth 
century, courts ―did assume the power to change the common 
law . . . .‖38 
The general recognition that courts do at times engage in 
lawmaking does not, however, dictate a single viewpoint about 
the proper scope of this power. It suffices to say at this point 
that even if the American system of government is generally 
sympathetic to the judicial lawmaking capacity, so that along-
side its dispute-resolution chore exists a ―second paramount 
function of the courts [which] is the enrichment of the supply of 
legal rules,‖39 then the different features of the court as law-
maker must be addressed in finer detail.40 The structure of 
modern government would be seriously undermined if the scope 
of legitimacy, process, and methodology of judicial lawmaking 
remain obscure. 
For purposes of the current study, I focus attention on 
what is perhaps the least-contestable legal setting in which the 
court makes law: the judicial development of traditional com-
mon law doctrines, most notably in the different fields of pri-
vate law. It is this sphere of activity in which Justice Aharon 
Barak, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, views 
the court as the ―senior partner‖ among the governmental enti-
ties in the crafting of the law.41 Even a conservative such as 
Justice Scalia has asserted that ―[he is] content to leave the 
common law, and the process of developing the common law, 
where it is,‖ while opposing the application of the common law 
―attitude‖ to statutory and constitutional interpretation.42  
There is, of course, much debate as to whether the common 
law dispute-based methodology is the best strategy to devise a 
set of legal norms to consistently and coherently order future 
                                                                                 
 38. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592, 2606 (2010).  
 39. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4 
(1988). 
 40. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 41. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme 
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 33–36 (2002).  
 42. Scalia, supra note 35, at 12. This latter caveat stands, of course, as the 
basis of Scalia‘s theory of textual interpretation of statutes and of the ―original 
understanding‖ in constitutional interpretation. See id. at 14–15 (arguing for 
a standard ―scientific‖ method of statutory interpretation, and arguing against 
allowing judges to modify the effect of statutes through interpretation and the 
common law). 
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legal relationships within a certain field of law. Even if courts 
are well aware of the potential ―distorting effect‖ that a specific 
dispute may have on the broader legal principles that they de-
velop,43 it is unlikely that courts would, or should, be able to 
perfectly mimic the abstract process and substantive products 
of statutory lawmaking.44  
In addition, numerous institutional considerations cast 
doubt on the ability of courts to legislate broad-based norms 
even within their natural habitat of common law jurisprudence. 
First, as Barak himself notes, courts may lack reliable informa-
tion about society and broader-based facts that might justify a 
change of the law.45 Second, even if courts are given full confi-
dence as policy makers so that they can incorporate societal 
values such as redistribution of resources, or otherwise engage 
in pushing forward broad-based social reform within the con-
tours of common law doctrines, courts lack both the ―purse‖46 
and the organizational mechanisms—i.e., governmental bu-
reaucracy or agencies—to guarantee the initial feasibility and 
the future implementation of the legal reform.47 Third, the abil-
ity of the court to update, revise, or entirely overturn a piece of 
legislation is dependent on having the case before it.48 Unlike a 
                                                                                 
 43. See generally Schauer, supra note 36, at 897–98 (discussing such po-
tential distortions, including the fact that judges may be captivated by the way 
that a certain case is framed).  
 44. See, e.g., id. at 915 (discussing how facial challenges to statutes neces-
sarily require judges to imagine the total array of possibilities as to how the 
statute could be applied, but these judges‘ perceptions are inevitably skewed 
by the facts of the cases before them). As Schauer notes, this does not mean 
that legislatures are free of the influence of special interests. Id. at 912–13. 
But legislation is generally considered to represent ―abstract reasoning‖ in 
norm-making, detached from the details of a specific dispute. See Catherine 
Valcke, Legal Education in a “Mixed Jurisdiction”: The Quebec Experience, 10 
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 61, 99–109 (1995) (discussing ―meta-legal‖ scholarship 
as a method of legal reasoning that incorporates considerations into law-
making that come from outside the legal field).  
 45. Barak, supra note 41, at 32–33; see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW‘S LIM-
ITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 60–70 (2001) 
(establishing an elaborate analysis of the institutional constraints of courts in 
addressing complex sets of data that involve large, often indefinite numbers of 
stakeholders).  
 46. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (―The Court‘s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.‖).  
 47. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 423 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that litigation steers activ-
ists for change to an institution that is unable to help them and diverts crucial 
resources away from the only realm that matters: politics).  
 48. See Schauer, supra note 36, at 913–16. 
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legislature or administrative agency that can initiate a rule 
change or control its timing, courts must depend on an exogen-
ous factor—a relevant dispute brought before them.49 As a re-
sult, courts cannot be time-sensitive in lawmaking—they can-
not make ―sunset laws,‖ nor can they initiate follow-up hear-
ings at the end of a trial period to review the new law.50 Conse-
quently, there are limited options that courts can pursue if they 
are to remain part of the lawmaking process.  
Notwithstanding, state courts engage extensively in law-
making in the traditional fields of common law. In view of the 
limits on the development of federal common law following the 
Erie51 doctrine, and the broad mandate awarded to courts from 
an intra-state separation of powers perspective,52 the judicial 
development of common law by state courts of last resort con-
tinues to stand firm.53  
B. THE JUDICIARY AS STATE ACTOR: SHELLEY, SULLIVAN, AND 
THEIR AFTERMATH 
The general facts and the operative result of the Shelley 
case were briefly presented in the Introduction.54 The fate of 
the Court‘s precedent in Shelley, which established the tenta-
tive doctrine by which any private dispute could be subjected to 
constitutional norms once it is brought before a court for reso-
lution, has, perhaps not surprisingly, become practically aban-
doned.55 Accordingly, both pro-Shelley theories and their criti-
                                                                                 
 49. See id. at 915–16.  
 50. See id.; see also Bruce Adams & Betsy Sherman, Sunset Implementa-
tion: A Positive Partnership to Make Government Work, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
78, 78 (1978) (discussing the evolution of sunset laws as a legislative tool). 
 51. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of lim-
its on federal common law, see infra Part I.C.2.  
 52. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 53. See, e.g., David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law 
Wrongful Discharge Doctrines: Up-date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 645, 645 (1996) (arguing that state courts have had numerous occa-
sions in recent years to rethink the development of common law doctrine in 
wrongful discharge cases). 
 54. See supra text accompanying notes 11–15.  
 55. Shelley has not been followed in subsequent Supreme Court and lower 
court cases. In numerous instances, courts have refused to apply constitution-
al norms to various categories of private disputes, even though there was judi-
cial enforcement involved. For a study of post-Shelley case law, see Mark D. 
Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 451, 458–70 (2007). For a survey of the ―state action‖ doctrine, 
see Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275–80 (2010). Shelley was limited to racial discrimination, 
and, even within this realm, its holding was practically narrowed to the specif-
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ques seem to focus on individual parties and on whether their 
private dealings should be subjected to constitutional prin-
ciples, or, more generally, on the modern role of the adminis-
trative state in private law.56 Whether the court is indeed a 
state actor, and what implications this carries, are issues that 
seem to have been neglected, probably due to the view that 
they are a distraction from the real query: does the pub-
lic/private distinction still hold?57 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ic facts of the case. Only one U.S. Supreme Court case has fully followed Shel-
ley‘s precedent. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 249–60 (1953) (striking 
down a state court judgment awarding damages for contractual breach against 
a property owner who signed a racially restrictive covenant but then sold the 
property to blacks). 
 56. Thus, to the extent that Shelley adopts an ―attribution rationale,‖ so 
that a court cannot enforce substantive provisions that could not have been 
enacted in general law because they would have violated constitutional rights, 
later decisions have nevertheless enforced such privately made provisions. See 
Rosen, supra note 55, at 458. For example, wills conditioning inheritance on 
the heir marrying a person of a particular religion were not subjected to the 
Establishment Clause merely because a judicial decision enforced these provi-
sions. See Shapira v. Union Nat‘l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 827–28 (Ohio Ct. 
Com. Pl. 1974). 
 57. See Rosen, supra note 55, at 471–72 (noting history of public/private 
distinction). Simply put, the post-Shelley courts refused to abolish or otherwise 
heavily undermine the public/private distinction. Viewing private parties and 
private action as generally immune from direct applicability of constitutional 
norms, courts seem to have dismissed the Shelley expansion of the ―state ac-
tion‖ doctrine to the judicial enforcement of private law as a subterfuge that 
may have prevented a morally objectionable result in the Shelley case, but 
that could not justify a broader-based curtailment of the private sphere. See 
id. (reasoning that the public/private distinction is strongly embedded in 
American culture, so that its survival in constitutional doctrine reflects a 
strong societal conviction); see also Richard A. Epstein, Classical Liberalism 
Meets the New Constitutional Order: A Comment on Mark Tushnet, 3 CHI. J. 
INT‘L L. 455, 459–60 (2002) (―The line between public and private action need 
not be gutted simply because the equal protection clause applies to some ac-
tions of the judiciary.‖). There are, of course, those who seek to justify Shelley 
on these grounds exactly. These scholars follow up on the legal realist idea 
that private law entrusts individuals with government-backed powers. See, 
e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11–14 
(1927) (depicting ownership of private property as the exercise of sovereignty 
over others with the endorsement of the State). If this is the case, then private 
parties cannot hide behind the largely artificial private/public distinction. See 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 
(1985) (―It is time to again ask why infringements of the most basic values—
speech, privacy, and equality—should be tolerated just because the violator is 
a private entity rather than the government.‖). More moderate versions of a 
pro-Shelley approach argue that even if constitutional rights should not al-
ways govern private legal relationships, constitutional norms can have an 
indirect application so that the underlying values of the Constitution would be 
adapted to private law doctrines. See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the 
Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 
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This Section, however, focuses on another aspect of Shelley, 
namely the institutional reasoning employed by the Court 
throughout its decision. Even if one finds a jurisprudential dis-
connect in at least one point along the chain of reasoning ad-
vanced in Shelley, the case still entails some important obser-
vations about the role of courts that are less controversial but 
nevertheless nontrivial. This view of courts is further en-
trenched in Sullivan, discussed below. Thus, once one puts to 
the side the conventional-yet-understandable focus on private 
parties and private action, the Shelley decision remains highly 
instructive as to the way in which a court acts as a state organ 
and employs coercive governmental powers in the process. Such 
an institutional conceptualization of courts carries substantial 
implications, especially when the court is viewed as a lawmak-
ing body, and most notably in the traditional common law field. 
Therefore, setting aside the peculiarities of Shelley, it is 
probably uncontroversial to argue that when a court engages in 
broad-based, future-looking reformulation of common law doc-
trines, such as in the above-portrayed hypothetical examples of 
the adverse possession and equitable right of redemption doc-
trines, the judicial act should be seen as implicating constitu-
tional review, as would be the case with otherwise comparable 
legislative or administrative reforms.58 Taking seriously the 
role of the court as a lawmaker requires us to also recognize the 
fact that such lawmaking could result in the violation of federal 
constitutional rights of present and future parties, what is re-
ferred to here as a ―judicial wrong.‖  
                                                                                                                                                                             
431–46 (2008). Others have argued that the public/private distinction loses 
much of its power in the era of the ―activist state,‖ which is increasingly com-
mitted to publicly enshrining social and economic rights that were once go-
verned by private law. See Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, 
and the Judicial Role: Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 435, 
438–42 (2002); see also Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the 
Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1521, 1556–70 (2010) (arguing that ―indirect constitutional effect‖ can be 
achieved through common law pathways to better protect ―positive‖ social and 
economic rights). 
 58. See, e.g., Jacob K. Javits & Gary J. Klein, Congressional Oversight and 
the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 455 
(1977) (questioning the constitutionality of congressional attempts to effect 
certain policies and programs without resort to piecemeal legislative sanction); 
see also Judah A. Shechter, De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative Agency 
Factual Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1483, 1483 (1988) (discussing judicial review of administrative determinations 
implicating constitutional rights). 
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The Shelley decision quotes the Court‘s previous case law, 
noting that  
It is doubtless true that a State may act through different agencies,—
either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and 
the prohibitions of the [Fourteenth] amendment extend to all action of 
the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by 
one of these agencies or by another.59 
When the judiciary acts, so reasons the Shelley decision, a court 
employs the ―full coercive power of government.‖60 
The Court then goes on to review a number of cases in 
which judicial decisions were struck down as a violation of fed-
eral constitutional rights, including judicial exclusion of blacks 
from jury service by reason of their race or color, failure by 
courts to provide the essential ingredients of a fair hearing, and 
a finding that a conviction for common law breach of the peace 
violated, under the circumstances of the case, the First 
Amendment‘s provisions on the freedom of religion.61 While 
these precedents dealt with more dispute-specific misconducts 
by the judiciary—those ―easy‖ cases of judicial wrongs in which 
the court blatantly infringed upon the litigants‘ constitutional 
rights—the Shelley Court explicitly expands its analysis to in-
clude more ―legitimate‖ forms of state action that may never-
theless violate constitutional rights.62  
This was exactly the case in Sullivan, where the Court in-
validated Alabama‘s libel law, which provided for an award of 
damages for a defamatory falsehood with no requirement of 
actual malice, as undercutting the First Amendment whenever 
the defamatory publication was directed at the official conduct 
of a public official.63 The Court‘s special rule for libel of public 
officials, requiring actual malice in such cases, was followed 
and is deemed less controversial from the perspective of the 
constitutionalization of private conduct.64 This is probably so 
                                                                                 
 59. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S 1, 14 (1948) (quoting Virginia v. Rivers, 
100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880)). 
 60. See id. at 19. 
 61. See id. at 14–18 (citations omitted). 
 62. See id. at 8–23. 
 63. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 64. See, e.g., Curtis Publ‘g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (holding 
that the State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
award damages to a ―public figure‖ for defamatory falsehood relating to his 
conduct unless verdict is based on actual malice); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 
75, 77 (1966) (holding that for purposes of decisional law, under First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, a state cannot award damages to a public official for 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless the official proves 
actual malice). 
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because, while the Court later extended this rule to ―public fig-
ures,‖65 it refused to apply the rule to private plaintiffs, leaving 
this general category of libel cases to state regulation.66 
More broadly, Sullivan establishes the principle by which 
all government-made laws, including common law rules, may 
be subjected to constitutional review. The Court reasoned that 
―[i]t matters not that the law has been applied in a civil action 
and that it is common law only, though supplemented by stat-
ute . . . . The test is not the form in which state power has been 
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact 
been exercised.‖67 The Court in Sullivan thus seemed agnostic 
about the question of whether the relevant legal regime is the 
result of statutory or judicial lawmaking.68 What is important 
is that an authorized actor of the state promulgated a body of 
law, and that this public ordering, like all laws, may result in 
an infringement of constitutional rights.69 
Thus, one uncontroversial component of the legacy of Shel-
ley and Sullivan points to the court as an organ of the state 
that engages in the development of legal rules, but one that 
may infringe on constitutional rights. This position is taken 
again years later in Stop the Beach, when Justice Scalia depicts 
the judiciary as an arm of the state that engages in lawmaking 
but that is also capable of ―taking‖ property by so doing.70  
C. CURRENT LIMITS ON STATE JUDICIAL LAWMAKING  
Parts II and III will explore the broader implications that 
the above conceptualization of the judiciary could have for fed-
eral judicial review of state judicial lawmaking. However, first, 
this Section discusses the extent to which state court lawmak-
ing is currently constrained, either by the principle of separa-
tion of powers at the state level or by judicial lawmaking at the 
federal level. 
                                                                                 
 65. Butts, 388 U.S. at 130–62 (applying the rule to defamatory publica-
tions directed at a football coach and a former army general). 
 66. See Gretz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–48 (1974).  
 67. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265 (citations omitted). 
 68. See id.  
 69. See id. For a slightly different basis for constitutional review of all 
forms of lawmaking, see Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 420 (―[T]he threshold 
state action issue is irrelevant wherever a law is challenged as unconstitu-
tional because all laws are subject to the Constitution under the Supremacy 
Clause.‖).  
 70. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592, 2610–13 (2010). For further discussion, see also infra Part II.A. 
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1. Intra-State Separation of Powers 
The legitimacy of judicial lawmaking should first be eva-
luated against the state‘s own system of government.71 This is 
most prominently so regarding the longstanding concept of se-
paration of powers.72 The way in which this principle is struc-
tured in the different states is not simply a miniature version of 
the federal conception of the separation of powers.73 There are 
substantial differences among the texts of the various state 
constitutions in defining the nature and scope of the separation 
of powers doctrine.74 
The differences among the state constitutions reflect not 
only distinctive historical developments, but also varying nor-
mative visions about the system of government.75 These atti-
tudes have developed over time in each of the different states, 
so that the current equilibrium within each state system is al-
ways implicated not only by the state constitutional text, but 
also by prevailing public views about the distribution of pow-
er.76 Consequently, the states‘ constitutional provisions regard-
ing the separation of powers is not necessarily indicative of the 
practical ways in which the different branches, especially the 
judiciary, engage in the exercise of powers that belong to other 
branches. 
                                                                                 
 71. See G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Con-
stitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 329 (2003). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 330. 
 74. See John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of the Alloca-
tion of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administra-
tive Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1236–37 (1993). Ten state constitutions 
omit any express requirement of the separation of powers, thus following the 
federal pattern by which this principle is inferred from the provisions estab-
lishing the three branches of government. Twelve constitutions include an 
express provision by which the powers are separated, with some of these fur-
ther stating that exercising powers belonging to another branch is prohibited, 
unless otherwise provided elsewhere in the constitution. The remaining state 
constitutions couple such an express provision with an additional clause pro-
hibiting any person belonging to or exercising power under any branch from 
holding office or exercising any function belonging to another. See id. 
 75. Many states initially rejected the suspicion of the legislative branch. 
See Tarr, supra note 71, at 333–34. During the nineteenth century, however, 
numerous states altered their constitutions to guard against an untrammeled 
exercise of legislative power. This was not typically done by transferring power 
to other branches, but by either transferring some powers directly to the 
people or by placing procedural restraints on legislative power, such as by 
requiring extraordinary majorities for certain statutes. See id. at 334–40.  
 76. See id. at 340. 
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One of the most prominent areas in which judicial state ac-
tion is viewed as involving substantial policy making and law-
making, and which is often contested as amounting to undue 
judicial activism, is education finance ―adequacy‖ litigation.77 
Out of the twenty-six state courts that have engaged in such 
adequacy litigation, eight courts refused to engage in merits 
review, typically relying on the separation of powers principle 
in justifying abstention.78 Eleven state courts approved merits 
review, but limited their remedial intervention, so that even if 
the legislature‘s education finance scheme was found to violate 
state constitutional standards of education quality the legisla-
ture could simply construct an alternative funding scheme.79 
The final group of seven state courts engaged in the highest 
level of judicial involvement, approving the respective trial 
courts‘ issuance of policy-directive remedial orders.80 
Since most of the normative debate surrounding the legi-
timacy of the courts‘ engagement in education finance policy-
making has focused on the separation-of-powers principle,81 it 
is highly instructive to see the way in which this concept plays 
out in each of the states. Interestingly, a recent study found no 
significant correlation between the relevant text of the state 
constitution, specifically whether it includes an explicit or im-
                                                                                 
 77. The first wave of education finance litigants in the 1960s and 1970s 
relied mostly on Equal Protection arguments, and contended that the alloca-
tion of funds discriminated against certain groups or classes. See Paul A. Mi-
norini & Stephen D. Sugerman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of 
Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND ADE-
QUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 34, 34–54 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999). 
The current strategy of education finance litigation focuses on the absolute 
―inadequacy‖ of overall public spending on education. See William E. Thro, 
Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The 
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 603–04 (1994). Sever-
al scholars have argued, however, that equity theories have far from disap-
peared in school finance litigation. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Standards, Test-
ing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1225 (2008) (arguing 
that courts continue to focus on whether resources among different school dis-
tricts are comparable).  
 78. See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Re-
view of Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitu-
tions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 741 (2010). 
 79. See id. at 742. 
 80. See id. at 742–43.  
 81. For an analysis of this critique against the judicial intervention in 
policymaking on allocating the state‘s scarce financial resources, and of poten-
tial answers to it, see, for example, Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: 
New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 100, 171–72 
(1995). 
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plicit provision about the separation of powers, and the actual 
level of judicial involvement in education finance.82 
These dynamics are also present among state branches of 
government in other lawmaking power struggles. Consider, for 
example, methodological rules of statutory interpretation, and 
whether state courts, in reading a statute, should follow a ―tex-
tualist‖ approach, a ―purposive‖ approach, or a different me-
thodology.83 Although just about every state legislature has co-
dified rules of statutory interpretation, many state courts have 
practically refused to apply these rules.84 Instead, state courts 
have come up with their own methodological rules of statutory 
interpretation.85  
These findings do not indicate, however, that the separa-
tion of powers principle is simply being ridiculed or ignored by 
state courts in carving out their lawmaking authority. Rather, 
this tension points to the fact that the allocation of powers is 
constantly debated as a major feature of the system of govern-
ment, and that the equilibrium of lawmaking powers varies 
from state to state while also changing over time within each 
state system.86  
Once again, the field of law that emerges as the least con-
troversial one from a state separation-of-powers perspective, 
and in which judicial lawmaking is deemed legitimate even 
when it implicates core policy considerations, is that of tradi-
tional common law.  
A leading example is the doctrine of implied warranty of 
habitability, which has been a major pillar in the landlord-
                                                                                 
 82. See Bauries, supra note 78, at 743–46. Legislatures have typically 
responded to ―judicial activism‖ with hostility and foot-dragging, thus practi-
cally continuing the power struggle over norm-making. See Ryan, supra note 
77, at 1241 (describing such dynamics in New Jersey). 
 83. The scholarly debate about rules of statutory interpretation tradition-
ally focuses on federal law—where, in effect, no agreed methodological rules 
exist. This leads state legal systems to engage in their own jurisprudential 
rules. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 
1750, 1824–29 (2010). 
 84. See id. (contending that while some courts simply avoid applying legis-
lative interpretative rules, other courts forthrightly refuse to apply such 
rules). 
 85. Id. at 1829–46. Gluck argues that this judicial methodological ap-
proach is often strikingly similar from state to state. Gluck labels this emerg-
ing approach as one of ―modified textualism.‖ Id.  
 86. See id. at 1826–28 (noting that there is a power struggle between the 
judicial and legislative branch about which branch will control methodological 
choice). 
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tenant law reform introduced by courts in the District of Co-
lumbia in the 1960s and 1970s, and consequently followed in 
the majority of states.87 In the leading case, Javins v. First Na-
tional Realty Corp.,88 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
declared that ―[c]ourts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines 
in the light of the facts and values of contemporary life—
particularly old common law doctrines which the courts them-
selves created and developed,‖89 and reasoned that ―[t]he con-
tinued validity of the common law . . . depends upon its ability 
to reflect contemporary community values and ethics.‖90 Treat-
ing a lease as a contract, the court read an implied warranty of 
quality into the lease.91 This reading parted ways with the ar-
chaic assumption that the tenant can feasibly make all neces-
sary repairs,92 and focused instead on protecting the ―legitimate 
expectations of the buyer.‖93  
The court-made doctrine of implied warranty of habitabili-
ty was quickly adopted by almost all states.94 In some states, 
the courts have reformulated their common law to accommo-
date the new principle, while in other states the warranty was 
codified by statute.95 While the specific scope and terms of the 
warranty may change from state to state,96 whenever the war-
ranty is applied to residential properties it cannot be waived by 
                                                                                 
 87. See generally Jonathan M. Purver, Modern Status of Rules as to Exis-
tence of Implied Warranty of Habitability or Fitness for Use of Leased Premis-
es, 40 A.L.R.3D 646 (1971) (discussing the development of the doctrine of im-
plied warranty of habitability). 
 88. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  
 89. Id. at 1074.  
 90. Id. (quoting Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. 
Cir. 1960)).  
 91. See id. at 1077–83. 
 92. Id. at 1074. The court reasons that this assumption may have been 
reasonable in a rural-agrarian society, but that for the modern apartment 
dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives him a place to live, which in-
cludes ―not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and venti-
lation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sani-
tation, and proper maintenance.‖ Id.  
 93. Id. at 1075.  
 94. See 1 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN & PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR., FRIEDMAN 
ON LEASES § 10:1.2, n.21 (5th ed. 2004). 
 95. See id. Such codification has taken place, for example, in Texas, Cali-
fornia, Minnesota, and North Carolina. Id.  
 96. For example, a few jurisdictions also apply the warranty to commer-
cial properties, though the majority of states restrict the warranty to residen-
tial use. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 448 (2006).  
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agreement.97 This makes this judicial reform one endowed with 
a thick layer of social policy design. 
Although the doctrine was initially codified in some states, 
this does not derogate from the fact that courts have been gen-
erally viewed across all states as authorized to extensively en-
gage in lawmaking in this field. A chief argument made in Part 
IV is that the contemporary landscape of common law doctrines 
often employs a mixed strategy of lawmaking, so that promo-
tion of reforms takes place through legislation and judicial ac-
tion. Courts thus maintain their legitimacy to engage in law-
making in traditional common law doctrines even in the ―age of 
statutes.‖98 From an intra-state separation of powers view, 
courts are retaining substantive lawmaking authority in craft-
ing common law doctrines.  
2. The Scope of Federal Judicial Preemption  
At times, federal lawmaking trumps state judicial lawmak-
ing. Since this issue is not unique to the state judiciary, but ap-
plies to any type of state lawmaking, I will touch briefly on one 
topic that would be of special interest in the judicial lawmaking 
context. In studying the plethora of issues that may create a 
tension between federal and state lawmaking, common law 
once again emerges as striking a distinctive balance between 
federal and state powers, while primarily implicating the judi-
ciaries on both levels.  
The point of departure is the U.S. Supreme Court‘s seminal 
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.99 In Erie, the Court 
held that state common law governs federal diversity cases, 
famously stating that ―[t]here is no general federal common 
law.‖100 The Court based its decision on several constitutional 
principles, including the Equal Protection Clause (fearing dis-
parate treatment based on the litigants‘ state citizenship),101 
and ideas of federalism enshrined chiefly in the Tenth Amend-
ment, so that substantive rules of common law relevant to the 
                                                                                 
 97. See FRIEDMAN & RANDOLPH, supra note 94, § 10:1.4 (reasoning that 
the this rule is ―based on a public policy affecting poor tenants who have no 
choice but to move into premises in a deplorable condition‖).  
 98. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
passim (1982); see also infra Part IV.B.  
 99. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 100. Id. at 78.  
 101. See id. at 74–75.  
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case were a matter ―reserved by the Constitution to the several 
states.‖102 
The legacy of Erie has been controversial as a matter of 
both doctrine and theory. This dispute will not be analyzed 
here,103 but it is important to note that in the context of Erie, 
the term ―federal common law‖ consists of ―federal rules of de-
cision whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of 
interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional com-
mands.‖104 This means that the Erie doctrine places federal 
courts at the heart of the constraints imposed on the federal 
government. Congress can effectively enter into new realms of 
federal ordering in traditional common law issues by resorting 
to the Constitution‘s provisions in Article 1, § 8, most notably 
those of the Commerce Clause.105 Federal courts do not have a 
similar constitutional mandate.106 Therefore, federal courts 
cannot regularly intervene in state judicial lawmaking in their 
own judicial lawmaking capacity.107 Federal courts, and most 
prominently the Supreme Court, could thus step in chiefly in 
their judicial review capacity, when state judicial lawmaking 
violates the protections of the Federal Constitution.108  
In summary, judicial lawmaking by state courts, who are 
acting as state actors, remains an important phenomenon even 
                                                                                 
 102. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 103. Doctrinally, federal common law seems to be constantly expanding, 
even though the Court rarely admits to doing so outside of the established 
―enclaves,‖ such as cases affecting the rights and obligations of the United 
States, disputes between states, international relations, and admiralty. How-
ever, despite this ―crawling‖ effect, the development of the core of common law 
fields generally remains within the states. See generally Jay Tidmarsh & 
Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585 
(2006). 
 104. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER‘S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 685 (5th ed. 2003).  
 105. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For an analysis of the cunning history of 
the use of the Commerce Clause to increase Congressional regulatory power, 
see generally Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010).  
 106. In an interesting development, a number of commentators have read 
Erie to represent not only a concept of federalism, but also one of separation of 
powers, which broadly prevents the federal judiciary from engaging in judicial 
policy making and lawmaking unless authorized to do so by the Constitution 
or by Congress. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safe-
guard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001). Others have dubbed this 
new reading of Erie as merely a myth. See Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s 
Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 619–20 (2008) (arguing it is practically impossi-
ble to differentiate common law from statutory or constitutional interpreta-
tion, remedial law, and other ―non-common-law‖ judicial decision-making).  
 107. See Clark, supra note 106, at 1403–04. 
 108. See id. at 1413. 
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in the contemporary era of the administrative State. Along with 
the power to engage in lawmaking, however, is the potential to 
infringe on legally enshrined individual rights. Thus, the chief 
challenge for the U.S. Supreme Court, acting in its judicial re-
view capacity, is how to assess such state judicial lawmaking 
when a potential ―judicial wrong‖ exists. Part II starts this in-
quiry by discussing how the Court has addressed one such in-
stance, that of a ―judicial taking.‖ 
II.  STOP THE BEACH AND THE CONCEPT OF A  
JUDICIAL WRONG   
This Part offers a close reading of the Stop the Beach case. 
After briefly mapping out the different opinions, it explicates on 
how Justice Scalia‘s invocation of the ―judicial taking‖ doctrine 
and Justice Kennedy‘s application of the Due Process Clause 
implicate the limits of judicial lawmaking but nevertheless 
leave many central issues unresolved.  
A. INTRODUCING THE JUDICIAL TAKING DOCTRINE  
In Stop the Beach, the Court reviewed the constitutional 
validity of a decision rendered by the Florida Supreme Court, 
in which the latter replied in the negative to the following 
question, certified to it by the state‘s Court of Appeal: ―On its 
face, does the Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitu-
tionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights without just 
compensation?‖109 The petitioner argued that the Florida Su-
preme Court‘s decision in itself amounted to an unconstitution-
al taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.110  
All eight participating Supreme Court Justices held that 
no such constitutional violation had occurred in this case.111 
While four Justices, in a decision authored by Justice Scalia, 
explicitly recognized that under certain circumstances a judi-
cial decision could amount to an unconstitutional taking of 
property—thus creating a new doctrine of ―judicial taking‖112—
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg left ―for another day‖ the general 
question of if, and when, a judicial taking could take place.113  
                                                                                 
 109. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 
130 S. Ct 2592, 2600 (2010). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2596; id. at 2618 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2619 (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
 112. Id. at 2608 (plurality opinion). 
 113. Id. at 2618–19 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg joined the 
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Under the common law in Florida, the state owns in trust 
for the public the land permanently submerged beneath navi-
gable waters and the foreshore, i.e., the land between the low-
tide line and the mean high-water line.114 Littoral property 
owners have certain unique rights with regard to the water and 
the foreshore.115 These rights include the right of access to the 
water, the right to use the water for certain purposes, the right 
to an unobstructed view of the water, and the right to receive 
accretions and relictions (referred to jointly as ―accretions‖ by 
the Court).116 Accretion is a slow, gradual process, by which 
lands once covered by water become dry when the water re-
cedes. Under common law, littoral owners take title to these 
lands.117  
The Florida common law provides for a different rule for 
the process of avulsion, a ―sudden or perceptible loss to or addi-
tion to land by the action of the water . . . .‖118 In the case of 
avulsion, formerly submerged land that has become dry land 
continues to belong to the owner of the seabed, which in Florida 
is the state.119 Thus, the boundary between littoral property 
and sovereign land remains the same: the mean high-water 
land before the event.120 
In 1961, Florida‘s legislature passed the Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act (the Act),121 which established procedures for 
―beach restoration and renourishment projects,‖ and was de-
signed to deposit land on eroded beaches and to maintain the 
deposited land.122 Under the Act, once a beach restoration 
project is approved and undertaken, the relevant state agency 
establishes an ―erosion control line,‖ which is set in reference to 
the existing mean high-water line.123 The fixed erosion-control 
line then replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as the 
boundary between privately owned littoral property and state 
property.124 This means that once the erosion-control line is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
opinion. Id. at 2618. 
 114. Id. at 2597–99 (plurality opinion). 
 115. Id. at 2598 (citations omitted). 
 116. Id. at 2594. 
 117. Id. at 2598. 
 118. Id. (citations omitted). 
 119. Id. at 2598–99. 
 120. Id. at 2599. 
 121. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§161.011–.45 (West 2006). 
 122. Id. § 161.088. 
 123. Id. § 161.161(3)–(5). 
 124. Id. § 161.191(1). 
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recorded, the common law ceases to increase upland property 
by accretion.125 The landowners continue to be entitled, howev-
er, ―to all common-law riparian rights,‖ except for the right to 
accretions.126  
Littoral owners in the City of Destin and Walton County 
challenged a restoration project, aimed at adding seventy-five 
feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line, arguing 
that the project takes their right to receive accretions to their 
property.127 The District Court of Appeal accepted their claim, 
which argued that the project would ―unreasonably infringe on 
riparian rights,‖ and certified to the Florida Supreme Court the 
broader question of the unconstitutionality of the Act.128 The 
Florida Supreme Court answered in the negative, faulting the 
District Court of Appeal for not considering the doctrine of 
avulsion, and describing the right to accretion as a future con-
tingent interest rather than a vested property right.129  
While the U.S. Supreme Court depicted the right to accre-
tion as one to which the Fifth Amendment would apply if the 
state took the right, it agreed with the Florida Supreme Court 
that the doctrine of avulsion also applies to state-created avul-
sions made as part of restoration and renourishment projects 
under the Act.130 The Court thus concluded that the judicial 
decision was consistent with the background principles of state 
property law.131 But although all Justices agreed in the judg-
ment, they significantly departed on the general question of 
judicial takings.  
Briefly, Justice Scalia made the argument that the Takings 
Clause has traditionally applied to state actions beyond the 
―classic‖ eminent domain, including state regulations that de-
prive the property owner of ―all economically beneficial 
uses,‖132 and the re-characterization as public property of what 
                                                                                 
 125. Id. § 161.191(2). 
 126. Id. § 161.201.  
 127. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592, 2600 (2010). The littoral owners also argued that the project 
would take away their right ―to have the contact of their property with the 
water remain intact.‖ Id. The Court addressed this argument and rejected it. 
Id. 
 128. Id. at 2600–02. 
 129. Id. at 2600–01. 
 130. Id. at 2612. 
 131. Id. at 2610–13.  
 132. Id. at 2601 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 
(1992)). 
 2011] JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 545 
 
was previously private property.133 Based on the language of 
the Fifth Amendment and on ―common sense,‖ Scalia reasoned 
that the Takings Clause ―is not addressed to the action of a 
specific branch or branches.‖134 It would be absurd, according to 
Scalia, ―to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Tak-
ings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.‖135 Further, ―[the 
Court‘s] precedents provide no support for the proposition that 
takings effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special 
treatment, and in fact suggest to the contrary,‖136 so that ―the 
particular state actor is irrelevant.‖137 The test for a ―judicial 
taking,‖ in the context of this case, is thus formulated by Jus-
tice Scalia as follows: ―If a legislature or a court declares that 
what was once an established right of private property no long-
er exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State 
had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by  
regulation.‖138  
In a brief separate opinion, Justice Breyer deemed it best 
to leave ―for another day‖ the broader constitutional issues 
raised by the plurality opinion.139 The chief concern of Justice 
Breyer is one of gate-flooding. Since ―losing parties in many 
state-court cases may well believe that the erroneous judicial 
decisions have deprived them of property rights they previously 
held and may consequently bring federal takings claims,‖ then 
―the approach the plurality would take today threatens to open 
the federal doors to constitutional review of any, perhaps large 
numbers of, state-law cases in an area of law familiar to state, 
but not federal, judges.‖140 Federal judges might therefore find 
themselves, according to Breyer, playing ―a major role in the 
shaping of a matter of significant state interest—state property 
law.‖141  
Justice Kennedy, in his separate opinion, did not affirma-
tively hold that a ―judicial taking‖ could or could not ever oc-
cur.142 But he did voice strong concerns about simply extending 
                                                                                 
 133. See id. (citing Webb‘s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 
155, 163–65 (1980)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 2601–02.  
 137. Id. at 2602. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. at 2619. 
 141. Id. at 2618–19. This issue will be taken up further in Part III.B.3.  
 142. Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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the Takings Clause to judicial decisions.143 Kennedy expressed 
doubt regarding the legitimacy of courts to engage in the taking 
of property, viewing this power as belonging to the political 
branches, i.e., the legislative and executive that are accounta-
ble in their political capacity for exercising such power.144 Judi-
cial elimination of an established property right could thus 
amount to a violation of due process.145 Although Kennedy re-
mained somewhat obscure about the nature of the due process 
violation, his general point was that, since the recognition of 
judicial takings would in effect legitimize the power of courts to 
engage in takings, the Due Process Clause146 is the more ap-
propriate channel to address potential encroachments by the 
judiciary on the power granted to the political branches.147 At 
the same time, Kennedy validated the legitimacy of state courts 
to make incremental changes to property rights without this 
implicating the Constitution148—a point that Scalia rejects as a 
practical mandate for uncompensated deprivations of estab-
lished rights.149  
B. DUE PROCESS, TAKINGS, AND THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL 
LAWMAKING 
This Section discusses three focal points of the Court‘s 
analysis in Stop the Beach. First, it frames the controversy be-
tween the Justices following Kennedy‘s suggestion that resort 
to the Due Process Clause is the appropriate channel for ad-
dressing judicial violation of property rights, while locating in-
cremental changes to common law property rights as falling 
outside constitutional protection. Second, it analyzes the way in 
which Scalia and Kennedy differ in their depiction of courts as 
either a more trustworthy or a more suspect state actor in the 
context of takings. Third, this Section takes up the debate of 
whether the mere recognition of the ―judicial taking‖ doctrine 
actually endows state courts with more power to take property.  
Evaluating these three themes, it seems that Justice Scalia 
has the better argument in the Due Process debate. The second 
                                                                                 
 143. Id. at 2615. 
 144. Id. at 2613–16. 
 145. Id. at 2615. 
 146. While not explicitly saying so, Justice Kennedy seems to refer to the 
Fifth Amendment‘s and the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clauses as 
one. See, e.g., id. at 2614. I will follow the same course in my analysis. 
 147. Id. at 2613–16. 
 148. Id. at 2615. 
 149. Id. at 2606–07 (plurality opinion). 
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topic, the institutional comparison between courts and legisla-
tures, remains very much underdeveloped by both Justices. Fi-
nally, Justice Kennedy‘s reasoning seems to prevail regarding 
the debate about the broader implications of the judicial taking 
doctrine. This leads to an odd result, by which neither of the 
opinions standing alone develops a coherent analysis of the 
proper mode of federal judicial review of state judicial lawmak-
ing. This is a gap that I aim at closing in the following Parts.  
To begin, one might initially read Justice Scalia‘s opinion 
as representing jurisprudential ―novelty,‖ with Justice Kennedy 
offering a more ―cautious‖ approach. But Kennedy‘s analysis of 
the Due Process Clause reveals a strict approach toward state 
courts, which is in fact reactionary to contemporary conceptions 
of judicial lawmaking. In reasoning that courts ―are not de-
signed to make policy decisions about ‗the need for, and likely 
effectiveness of, regulatory actions‘‖150 and that ―[t]he usual due 
process constraint is that courts cannot abandon settled prin-
ciples,‖151 Kennedy‘s position seems far from representing 
longstanding practices of courts, especially in common law 
fields.  
As Part I has shown, state (and federal) courts have long 
engaged in core policy decisions in reforming common law doc-
trines, such as by introducing the implied warranty of habita-
bility with its strong regulatory feature.152 And as is well 
known, the stare decisis principle has never been an insur-
mountable barrier for courts, when changing needs and times 
have justified, in their view, the overruling of precedents.153 
In fact, the position that stood as the basis of the Court‘s 
formerly suspicious approach toward the doctrine of judicial 
takings is directly contrary to Justice Kennedy‘s viewpoint. In 
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, which rejected 
the notion of a judicial taking, Justice Brandeis famously 
stated:  
The process of trial and error, of change of decision in order to con-
form with changing ideas and conditions, is traditional with courts 
administrating the common law. Since it is for the state courts to in-
                                                                                 
 150. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 151. Id.  
 152. See supra text accompanying notes 88–97.  
 153. See EISENBERG, supra note 39, at 104–45. For an analysis of the ple-
thora of instances in which courts have often overruled or otherwise over-
turned common-law precedents, see id. at 145 (reasoning that ―overruling, 
inconsistent distinguishing, and other forms of overturning do not necessarily 
involve discontinuity‖). 
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terpret and declare the law of the State, it is for them to correct their 
errors and declare what the law has been as well as what it is. State 
courts, like this Court, may ordinarily overrule their own decisions 
without offending constitutional guaranties, even though parties may 
have acted to their prejudice on the faith of the earlier decisions.154 
Controversial as Justice Brandeis‘s opinion is, as it com-
pletely shields judicial lawmaking from federal constitutional 
constraints, while subjecting similar legislative and adminis-
trative ―trial and error‖ lawmaking to constitutional scruti-
ny,155 Justice Kennedy goes to the other extreme. Justice Ken-
nedy does so by automatically applying the Due Process Clause 
to invalidate any judicial decision that would ―eliminate or 
change established property rights‖156 in the process of reform-
ing a common law doctrine, viewing it as an illegitimate exer-
cise of an authority that belongs to the other branches.157 
Justice Kennedy‘s opinion is even more puzzling in view of 
his statement that ―[s]tate courts generally operate under a 
common-law tradition that allows for incremental modifications 
to property law.‖158 This means that while ―incremental modifi-
cations‖ would not at all implicate constitutional concerns, once 
the court ―eliminates or substantially changes established 
property rights‖ the Due Process Clause would invalidate such 
a decision as ―arbitrary or irrational,‖ meaning simply unau-
thorized in Kennedy‘s view.159 
But drawing the line between incremental modifications 
and elimination or substantial change to property rights is far 
from a simple, straightforward task. Accordingly, delineating 
the contours of illegitimate or unauthorized judicial action is 
much trickier than what Justice Kennedy portrays. Needless to 
say, the regulatory takings doctrine has been such a muddle 
exactly because it may be extremely difficult to distinguish a 
constitutional violation from a no-violation scenario when a  
                                                                                 
 154. 281 U.S. 673, 681 n.8 (1930). 
 155. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 
1466–67 (1990) (explaining that Brandeis‘s opinion in Brinkerhoff-Faris puts 
judicial lawmaking in a separate category from legislative and administrative 
agencies and noting that Brandeis, in dicta, stated that state court changes to 
the common law were not subject to constitutional restrictions, unlike actions 
by legislative and administrative agencies). 
 156. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592, 2614 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 157. See id. (―If a judicial decision, as opposed to an act of the executive or 
the legislature, eliminates an established property right, the judgment could 
be set aside as a deprivation of property without due process of law.‖). 
 158. Id. at 2615.  
 159. Id. 
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governmental entity takes a certain action that adversely af-
fects property rights.160 Thus, in view of the infeasibility of the 
all-or-nothing approach that Justice Kennedy advances, Justice 
Scalia seems to be on stronger footing in arguing that takings 
jurisprudence, with its built-in nuances, cannot simply be 
deemed irrelevant for reviewing the entire spectrum of common 
law decisions that impact property rights.161 
A second point of contention between Scalia and Kennedy 
concerns the nature of the judiciary and its potential propensity 
to violate constitutional rights. The debate here is extremely 
brief and lacking, mainly because it is conducted on entirely dif-
ferent levels. 
Justice Kennedy‘s position is that a court basically engages 
in institutional usurpation when it ―eliminates or substantially 
changes established property rights.‖162 In contrast, Justice 
Scalia follows the more conventional rationales for constitu-
tional scrutiny, saying that Kennedy‘s ―injection of separation-
of-powers principles into the Due Process Clause would also 
have the ironic effect of preventing the assignment of the ex-
propriation function to the branch of government whose proce-
dures are, by far, the most protective of individual rights.‖163 
This least-dangerous-branch argument by Scalia thus legiti-
mizes the power of courts to engage in lawmaking, without ex-
empting them from constitutional review in case of an alleged 
violation of rights.164  
It is, however, unclear if courts are indeed categorically 
less prone to violate constitutional rights, such as the right of 
private property, in their lawmaking functions. In his 1990 ar-
ticle on judicial takings, Barton Thompson argues that in con-
                                                                                 
 160. See William P. Barr et al., The Gild That Is Killing the Lily: How Con-
fusion over Regulatory Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protections 
of the Takings Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433–38, 481–85 (2005) (ex-
plaining the difficulty of distinguishing between government regulatory ac-
tions—which are rarely considered takings—and government appropriations, 
which are always considered a taking). See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon 
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 
(1984) (analyzing approaches to takings and stating that one of the most diffi-
cult property issues is deciding when certain government actions constitute a 
taking).  
 161. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 162. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 163. Id. at 2605 (plurality opinion). 
 164. See id. at 2605–08 (explaining that the judicial branch is the ―most 
protective of individual rights‖ and stating that the Court ―must not say that 
we are bound by the Constitution never to sanction judicial elimination of 
clearly established property rights‖). 
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sidering rights-oriented rationales (e.g., the right not to be 
coerced, or the right not to share an unjustifiably large portion 
of public costs), and process-oriented rationales (e.g., the risk of 
demoralization costs of uncompensated takings, fear of political 
discrimination against property owners, or the problem of ―fis-
cal illusion‖),165 one cannot assume that courts will be entirely 
protective of individual rights, or that affected parties will con-
sider courts as protective even when they are on the losing 
side.166 Thompson thus sees no overarching justification for re-
leasing courts from constitutional property review.167 Whatever 
conclusion one may reach in this institutional comparison, Jus-
tice Scalia‘s statement offers little guidance as to the specific 
characteristics of the Court‘s review of state court decisions im-
plicating private property, as compared with federal review of 
legislative and administrative decisions.168 
Finally, Justices Scalia and Kennedy diverge on whether 
recognizing a ―judicial taking‖ doctrine would in itself empower 
courts to engage in such types of actions. According to Kenne-
dy, ―[b]ut were this Court to say that judicial decisions become 
takings when they overreach, this might give more power to 
courts, not less.‖169 If a court ―decide[s] that enacting a sweep-
ing new rule to adjust the rights of property owners in the con-
text of changing social needs is a good idea,‖ Kennedy predicts 
that ―[k]nowing that the resulting ruling would be a taking, the 
courts could go ahead with their project, free from constraints 
that would otherwise confine their power.‖170 Consequently, ―a 
State might find itself obligated to pay a substantial judgment 
                                                                                 
 165. For these different rationales, see Thompson, supra note 155, at 1472–
98. 
 166. Id. at 1495–97 (explaining that there are imperfections to judicial 
decision making in property law). 
 167. See id. at 1472–1512 (stating the importance of judicial review of 
property decisions). 
 168. See Mitch L. Walter, Comment, From Background Principles to Bright 
Lines: Justice Scalia and the Conservative Bloc of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Attempt to Change the Law of Property as We Know It [Stop the Beach Re-
nourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection., 130 S. 
Ct. 2592 (2010)], 50 WASHBURN L.J. 799, 822 (2010) (concluding that Justice 
Scalia did not deny that barring federal courts from reviewing state court de-
cisions would ―result in a flood of takings claims coming directly to the U.S. 
Supreme Court‖ but did not address this concern nor did he address Justice 
Kennedy‘s ―remedy-oriented concerns,‖ resulting in little specific guidance on 
the Court‘s judicial review of such decisions). 
 169. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 170. Id.  
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for the judicial ruling.‖171 Justice Scalia replies that this would 
not be the case: ―[I]f we were to hold that the Florida Supreme 
Court had effected an uncompensated taking in this case, we 
would not validate the taking by ordering Florida to pay com-
pensation. We would simply reverse the . . . judgment.‖172 As a 
result, ―[t]he power to effect a compensated taking would then 
reside, where it has always resided . . . in the Florida Legisla-
ture—which could either provide compensation or acquiesce in 
the invalidity of the offending features of the Act.‖173  
It is true that the Court could choose among different re-
medies in addressing a judicial-taking scenario.174 But in some 
sense, Justice Scalia‘s approach, by which the state judicial 
lawmaking would practically become non est factum, is simply 
unrealistic.  
Scalia‘s suggested remedy of simply reversing the state 
judicial action would itself have the ―ironic effect of preventing 
the assignment of the expropriation function to the branch of 
government whose procedures are, by far, the most protective of 
individual rights.‖175 By refusing to validate such a judicial act 
and ordering payment of just compensation, Scalia reaches the 
exact same result that Kennedy is trying to achieve by using 
the Due Process doctrine—i.e., ruling that a court is in effect 
unauthorized to engage in a taking.176 In so doing, Scalia de-
viates from the Court‘s conventional understanding of the Tak-
ings Clause, which ―does not bar government from interfering 
with property rights, but rather requires compensation in the 
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.‖177 
In this sense Justice Kennedy has the better argument in sug-
gesting that formally introducing a ―judicial taking‖ doctrine 
has the inevitable effect of enabling courts to engage in the re-
structuring of property rights.178  
                                                                                 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 2607 (plurality opinion). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Thompson, supra note 155, at 1514–21 (suggesting an array of 
remedies). 
 175. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2605.  
 176. See id. at 2613–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining why the court 
should not recognize a judicial takings doctrine). 
 177. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (quoting First 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. City of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 
(1987)). 
 178. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2615–16 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(explaining that recognizing a judicial takings doctrine would give more power 
to courts to do what they want with property rights). 
 552 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:520 
 
We are thus left with a rather odd state of events, by which 
neither of the opinions standing alone formulates a coherent 
theory of judicial deprivation of property rights. More broadly, 
the Justices leave open crucial questions about the proper ju-
risprudential framework for federal judicial review of state 
judicial wrongs in general. Part III takes up the challenge of 
conceptualizing such a model of ―judicial review of judicial 
lawmaking.‖  
III.  THE NEXT STEP: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
 JUDICIAL LAWMAKING   
This Part addresses the core issue that arises from Stop the 
Beach but that has not been adequately conceptualized by the 
different opinions—namely, how should the legal system con-
struct a model for federal judicial review of state judicial law-
making?  
A. NO ―SPECIAL TREATMENT‖? 
It is now time to frame the main conclusions reached so far 
in the broader context of ―judicial wrongs‖ and the judicial re-
view thereof. State courts have significant, well-established 
powers to engage in lawmaking, especially in common law doc-
trines.179 In so doing, they act as full-fledged state actors, exer-
cising the ―full coercive power of government.‖180 Such lawmak-
ing is often considered perfectly legitimate from the state per-
spective of separation of powers, and when common law is con-
cerned, state courts would hardly be constrained by federal 
judicial lawmaking. At the same time, state courts should be 
held accountable for potential violations of federal constitution-
al rights, even if these occur as a byproduct of otherwise benign 
judicial reform. These assumptions in place, how should such 
lawmaking be affected by federal judicial review, compared 
with legislative or regulatory lawmaking? Should judicial law-
making that may result in a judicial wrong indeed receive no 
―special treatment‖? For this purpose, consider the two hypo-
thetical judicial actions presented in the Introduction.  
                                                                                 
 179. See generally Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of Federal Courts, 
12 PACE L. REV. 263, 265–73 (1992) (discussing the history of common law 
lawmaking). 
 180. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). 
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1. The Adverse Possession Reform  
 First, consider the judicial reform of the state adverse pos-
session doctrine, eliminating the requirement by which the 
possession has to be ―continuous for the statutory period,‖181 an 
element that had been set up in previous state case law.182 
What could the potential federal constitutional impact be, and 
how should judicial review assess this state ruling?  
This new rule probably cannot be seen as a full-scale tak-
ing of a landowner‘s ―stick‖ of ownership.183 The right to bring 
an action against a trespasser has not been abolished,184 and 
there is no objective threshold of a minimal continuous period 
of possession.185 This is especially so because the overall pe-
riods of the statutes of limitations vary widely from state to 
state, from five to forty years.186 So, if the statute of limitations 
establishes an overall twenty year period, and the court rules 
that this timeframe could be divided into consecutive posses-
sions of five years each by the same adverse possessor for an 
overall period of twenty years, it is unclear if the owner‘s rights 
have been objectively deprived.187 At the same time, this reform 
does derogate to some extent, at least in theory, from the  
landowner‘s ―bundle.‖188  
Such a judicial reform could thus be challenged as a poten-
tial ―regulatory taking‖ case that should be seemingly governed 
by the three-prong test created in Penn Central Transportation 
                                                                                 
 181. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 150–51 
(2d ed. 2005) (explaining the ―continuous‖ element of adverse possession). 
 182. For this element, and the doctrine in general, see Part IV.A and infra 
text accompanying notes 305–08.  
 183. For cases holding that the uncompensated deprivation of one of the 
―sticks‖ of a property ―bundle‖ would amount to a taking, see, e.g., Hodel v. 
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (reasoning that ―the right to pass on‖ property 
is ―itself a valuable right‖); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419, 435–36 (1982) (portraying the power to exclude as ―one of the 
most treasured strands in an owner‘s bundle of property rights‖).  
 184. See SINGER, supra note 181, at 143 (explaining that the owner can 
bring an action for ejectment against a non-owner). 
 185. See id. at 150 (explaining that the continuity period depends on the 
statute of limitation determined by the state). 
 186. See id. at 157 ( listing the statutory periods in various states).  
 187. See id. at 151 (explaining that a person can adversely possess property 
for less than the period required by the statute of limitations if there are suc-
ceeding periods of possession called tacking); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., su-
pra note 23, at 121 (stating that entry must be continuous for the statutory 
period, but not necessarily constant). 
 188. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 83 (describing property as a 
―bundle‖ of rights); SINGER, supra note 181, at 142 (describing the legal rights 
of owners in the context of adverse possession). 
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Co. v. City of New York, which requires a weighing of (1) ―the 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;‖ (2) ―the ex-
tent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations;‖ and (3) ―the character of the 
governmental action.‖189  
In comparing review of a regulatory taking case to that of 
an otherwise identical legislation or regulation, the first two 
prongs would seem largely unaffected by the potential peculiar-
ity of the reviewed judicial action. The first prong deals with a 
quantitative component of the economic loss, while the second 
deals with the property owner‘s past investments and conse-
quent expectations against the background of the former legal 
regime.190 
The third prong might result in a slightly more awkward 
test in the context of a potential ―judicial regulatory taking.‖ In 
Penn Central, Justice Brennan explains the ―character of the 
governmental action‖ by saying that a taking ―may more readi-
ly be found when the interference with property can be charac-
terized as a physical invasion by government than when inter-
ference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits 
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.‖191 
One could understand the latter part of this statement as eval-
uating the underlying motivation of the governmental branch 
as either publicly benign or as self-serving, or as Steven Eagle 
suggested, as looking into the ―worthiness‖ of the government‘s 
regulatory purpose.192  
This is, however, not the conventional reading of this 
prong. In analyzing the third Penn Central prong in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,193 the Court seemed to 
focus on the distinction between a permanent invasion and a 
regulation as the litmus test for the prong.194 Moreover, in Lin-
gle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the Court reasoned that takings ju-
                                                                                 
 189. 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978). 
 190. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use 
Regulation, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1249–56 (2009) (analyzing the first two 
prongs).  
 191. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.  
 192. Steven J. Eagle, “Character” as “Worthiness”: A New Meaning for 
Penn Central’s Third Test?, 27 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 6–7 (2004) (explain-
ing that the ―character test‖ would consider the motivation and circumstances 
of the regulator). 
 193. For the Court‘s holding, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432–38 (1982) (discussing the distinction between perma-
nent occupation and a temporary invasion). 
 194. Id. at 426–27.  
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risprudence focuses on the ―magnitude or character of the bur-
den a particular regulation imposes upon private property 
rights‖ or on ―how any regulatory burden is distributed among 
property owners,‖ but it does not question the legitimacy of the 
goal that the governmental body seeks to promote.195 Such in-
quiry is located rather within the realm of substantive due 
process jurisprudence.196 
It is indeed under a substantive due process test that the 
judicial review of the judicial lawmaking encounters genuine 
conceptual difficulty. In the early twentieth century, the Court 
looked at whether the governmental regulation was ―clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.‖197 In the 
Court‘s contemporary language in Lingle, ―[t]he ‗substantially 
advances‘ formula suggests a means-ends test: It asks, in es-
sence, whether a regulation of private property is effective in 
achieving some legitimate public purpose.‖198  
Consider therefore a potential substantive due process 
challenge to the adverse possession judicial reform. One argu-
ment could be that even if the ―growing need to use lands more 
efficiently‖199 is a legitimate public purpose,200 increasing the 
scope of immunity to trespassers by shortening the period for 
consecutive possessions is not an effective means to achieve 
such an end. Adverse possessions are piecemeal, anecdotal, and 
lack any sort of coordinated action to ensure the more efficient 
allocation of lands.201  
So how is the federal reviewing court to inspect the consti-
tutionality of the state judicial reform under a substantive due 
process argument? The Court in Lingle, in warning against the 
expansion of the ―substantially advances‖ formula to takings 
jurisprudence, reasoned that a heightened means-ends review 
of regulation ―would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of 
                                                                                 
 195. 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005). 
 196. See id.  
 197. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).  
 198. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.  
 199. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 200. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 
GEO. L.J. 2419, 2435–36 (2001) (discussing the notion that adverse possession 
does not always serve the public purpose of putting land to productive use or 
encouraging certain behaviors from landowners).  
 201. See id. (explaining that adverse possession does not always result in 
the more efficient use of lands because the risk of adverse possession creates 
an incentive to monitor one‘s property, not necessarily an incentive to use the 
land productively). 
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a vast array of state and federal regulations—a task for which 
courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower—and 
might often require—courts to substitute their predictive 
judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agen-
cies.‖202 This explains, per the Court, why ―we have long 
eschewed such heightened scrutiny when addressing substan-
tive due process challenges to government regulation.‖203 
Should the Court, in its judicial review capacity, exercise 
such a careful approach to judicial reforms? Should it indeed 
refrain from substituting its ―predictive judgments‖ for those of 
the state court, which initiated the reform in its role as a com-
mon law norm-maker? Alternatively, a case could be made for 
approaching this problem in a completely different manner: If 
courts are not well suited to evaluate ends and the means to 
attain them, the judicial reviewer should not defer at all to the 
judicial lawmaker. This is because both courts are located in 
exactly the same (inferior) position to evaluate the prospects 
and perils of such a reform. While the state court obviously has 
a more intimate acquaintance with the social and economic 
background of the specific state—a point I address in detail in 
Part III.B below—one could argue that this does not necessari-
ly indicate inherent superiority of the state court in analyzing 
means-ends congruence or in assessing the reform‘s implica-
tions on the Constitution.  
2. The Equitable Redemption Reform 
Consider now the second hypothetical scenario, in which a 
state court of last resort revises the equitable right of redemp-
tion so as to adjust to contemporary circumstances the original 
purpose of this right, i.e., protecting homeowners who had for-
merly defaulted on their mortgage but who had once again be-
come solvent and now wish to avoid the harsh consequences of 
being evicted under a strict application of the foreclosure pro-
cedure.  
Viewing this right as designed to protect typically less 
well-to-do homeowners who encountered financial difficulties, 
but not to enable lenders to strategically exercise a legal option 
to make payments based on more general market conditions, 
the state court decides that the doctrine should be somewhat 
reframed. Created by English equity courts hundreds of years 
                                                                                 
 202. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544. 
 203. Id. at 545.  
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ago, the doctrine must now be reevaluated ―in order to conform 
with changing ideas and conditions.‖204  
To achieve this need while providing clear legal guidance 
to future lenders and borrowers, the state court holds that the 
doctrine would now generally apply only to homeowners who 
live below the federal poverty line or who own no other real 
property.  
What could be the potential grounds for federal judicial re-
view, and in what way, if any, would such a review be distin-
guishable from a constitutional assessment of an otherwise 
identical reform that would have been passed by the state‘s leg-
islature?  
One potential constitutional argument suggests that 
homeowner-debtors who no longer enjoy the equitable redemp-
tion right under the new regime have had one of their property 
―sticks‖ taken without just compensation in violation of the 
Takings Clause. The test would thus simply follow Justice Sca-
lia‘s formulation of the judicial-taking case, where the court 
ruled ―that what was once an established right of private prop-
erty no longer exists.‖205 Even if the state court acknowledges 
that it has changed the common law, the dispute would never-
theless entangle the debate between Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy on whether the judicial reform introduces only ―incremen-
tal changes,‖ and even if so, whether such a change would avoid 
implicating the Takings Clause.206  
A different potential basis for constitutional review, the 
claim that the new judicial norm implicates the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause, reveals more vividly 
the peculiarities of federally reviewing the state court‘s alleged 
―judicial wrong.‖207 Should federal judicial review of such a 
                                                                                 
 204. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 n.8 
(1930). 
 205. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010).  
 206. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text.  
 207. Interestingly, in Shelley, the Court held the state court to be in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause not for changing the law, but quite the 
opposite, for simply maintaining settled state common law principles enforcing 
the privately drafted restrictive covenant. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21–
23 (1948). But, most likely, potential challenges to state common law jurispru-
dence would look more like the equitable redemption example, such that a 
shift in the common law would arguably unconstitutionally differentiate 
among classes of persons. In the example before us, the new delineation of the 
doctrine could be contested as an affirmative-action-type discrimination made 
on the basis of socioeconomic status. 
 558 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:520 
 
state judicial lawmaking follow the three-tiered Equal Protec-
tion framework designed for assessing legislation or regula-
tion?208 If this is the case, the equitable redemption example 
would thus fall under ―rational basis‖ review, the most deferen-
tial tier of review, since wealth is generally considered to be a 
non-suspect class under the holding in San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez.209 
Notwithstanding slight varieties in the application of the 
rational basis test,210 the test is seen as materially different 
from the ―strict scrutiny‖211 or ―intermediate scrutiny‖212 tiers 
of review, because of the view that under ordinary circums-
tances, judicial review ―is not a license for courts to judge the 
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.‖213 
The dilemma about applying the ―rational basis‖ standard 
of review to judicial lawmaking is in many respects reminis-
cent of the debate about the application of the substantive due 
process ―substantially advances‖ formula to the adverse posses-
sion judicial reform.214 In both instances, the Court reasons 
that it is not in a position, in its judicial review capacity, to eva-
                                                                                 
 208. The three tiers of judicial scrutiny of government actions which are 
claimed to infringe the Equal Protection Clause are rational basis review (the 
most lenient type of review), intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. See 
infra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.  
 209. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 210. The conventional analysis of this tier gives the reviewed classification 
a ―strong presumption of validity,‖ emphasizing that rational basis review 
does not authorize the judiciary to ―sit as a superlegislature to judge the wis-
dom or desirability of legislative policy determinations.‖ Heller v. Doe, 509 
U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) 
(per curiam)). A more demanding version, articulated in a few cases, requires 
that ―the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon 
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object 
of the legislation.‖ F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 
(1920). For a discussion of these ―weak‖ and ―strong‖ versions of rational basis 
review, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
481, 512–18 (2004).  
 211. ―Strict scrutiny‖ relates to classifications based on race or national 
origin. To pass constitutional muster, the suspect classification ―must be justi-
fied by a compelling governmental interest and must be ‗necessary . . . to the 
accomplishment‘ of their legitimate purpose.‖ Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 
432–33 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).  
 212. Courts apply ―intermediate scrutiny‖ review to classifications based on 
gender. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Within this middle tier, the 
classification ―must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.‖ Id. 
 213. FCC v. Beach Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).  
 214. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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luate the ―wisdom‖ of the lawmaker.215 These statements seem 
based on the Court‘s more general self-perception that a court 
is a body with inferior institutional capacity and bounded dem-
ocratic legitimacy to second-guess lawmaking. But if it is 
another court that it is reviewing, may not one ―not-well-
suited‖ court feel unconstrained in passing judgment on a 
state-level institution suffering from the same shortcomings?  
B. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS ON REVIEWING JUDICIAL LAWMAKING  
To further investigate the potential peculiarities of federal 
judicial review of state judicial lawmaking, this Part briefly 
identifies more general principles of federal judicial interven-
tion in state court decision making and analyzes the way in 
which these broader-based considerations implicate the partic-
ular dilemmas addressed in the Article.  
1. Fact and Law Finding  
Consider, first, the general principles under which federal 
judicial review evaluates questions of fact and law decided by 
state courts, as compared with the federal assessment of law- 
and fact-finding by the state legislative and executive branches. 
As for fact finding, the two chief reasons for judicial deference 
to the legislative—and, to a lesser extent, executive branches—
are, first, that legislators and regulators are institutionally su-
perior in gathering and assessing facts,216 and second, that 
courts generally lack the authority or political legitimacy to 
question fact finding, especially when it is made by the legisla-
ture.217 Accordingly, the Court has ruled that with respect to 
such fact finding, made on either the federal or state level, 
those challenging it ―must convince the court that the legisla-
tive facts . . . could not reasonably be conceived to be true by 
                                                                                 
 215. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005); Beach 
Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313. 
 216. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994) (―As 
an institution . . . Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to ‗amass 
and evaluate vast amounts of data‘ . . . . And Congress is not obligated, when 
enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type that an administrative 
agency or court does to accommodate judicial review.‖ (citations omitted)).  
 217. See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. 
Co., 393 U.S. 129, 136–38 (1968) (deferring to the Arkansas legislature‘s deci-
sion to increase safety by requiring full train crews, reasoning that the ―ques-
tion of safety in the circumstances of this case is essentially a matter of public 
policy, and public policy can, under our constitutional system, be fixed only by 
the people acting through their elected representatives‖). 
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the governmental decision maker.‖218 While this approach has 
been criticized219 and legislatures and administrators have not 
been immune from review of their fact finding,220 such bodies 
enjoy substantial deference due both to institutional capacity 
and democracy.221  
In contrast, constraints on federal judicial review of fact 
finding by state courts are premised on relatively soft concep-
tions of federalism and, more dominantly, on self-limiting rules 
of practice. As a result, the Court has allowed itself to engage, 
in certain situations, in independent judgment of the factual 
basis of certain constitutional claims. This is clearly the case 
when state courts explicitly focus on questions of federal consti-
tutional law and make factual findings to arrive at legal con-
clusions. In Norris v. Alabama,222 in the context of racial exclu-
sion from state juries, the Court reasoned that ―whenever a 
conclusion of law of a state court as to a federal right and find-
ings of fact are so intermingled that the latter control the for-
mer, it is incumbent upon us to analyze the facts in order that 
the appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be as-
sured.‖223  
After Norris, limits on the Court‘s review of state court 
fact-finding rest not primarily on federalism, but rather on the 
general delineation of the Court‘s appellate jurisdiction.224 But 
these limits have not prevented the Court from practically 
making independent judgment on application of constitutional 
law, such as the areas of coerced confessions, free speech,225 or 
in the collateral review of habeas corpus.226 As Henry Monag-
                                                                                 
 218. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1981) 
(quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).  
 219. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legis-
lative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (2009) (arguing that legislatures do ―a 
poor job of gathering and assessing facts‖ and that these fact-finding short-
comings are ―particularly stark when laws restrict core personal rights and 
liberties‖).  
 220. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 666 (―That Congress‘ predictive judgments are 
entitled to substantial deference does not mean, however, that they are insu-
lated from meaningful judicial review altogether.‖). 
 221. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
 222. 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
 223. Id. at 589–90. 
 224. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 229, 261 (1985). 
 225. Id. at 260–62. 
 226. A federal statute requires federal courts to defer to factual findings 
made in state court when considering some habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(1) (2006) (―In a proceeding . . . for a writ of habeas corpus by a person 
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han notes, although the formulas for allowing the Court to re-
view state court fact finding vary—including reviewing ―inter-
mingled‖ questions of law and fact, ensuring that the federal 
right was not ―denied in substance,‖ or the need to determine 
whether ―sufficient evidence existed‖—―the entire substance of 
constitutional fact review ha[s] become the operative measure 
of the Supreme Court‘s general appellate jurisdiction.‖227  
What would be the result when a federal court reviews a 
state court‘s fact and law finding in a more conventional matter 
of state law—such as a common law doctrine—that is neverthe-
less contested as implicating a certain federal constitutional 
right? Three principles regularly inform the understanding of 
the Court‘s appellate authority over such judgments of state 
courts of last resort. First, the Supreme Court‘s jurisdiction is 
limited ―to the correction of errors relating solely to Federal 
law.‖228 Second, a state court judgment resting upon an ―ade-
quate and independent‖ nonfederal ground precludes the Court 
from reviewing ―even the erroneously determined federal issues 
in the case.‖229 Third, and potentially most relevant in the con-
text of reviewing state judicial lawmaking, is the principle by 
which the federal reviewing court is generally ―bound to accept 
the interpretation of [the State‘s] law by the highest court of 
the State.‖230 
The latter principle, which limits the federal court to con-
sidering if the state court‘s determination of state law was 
based on a ―fair and substantial basis,‖ has been somewhat 
modified, and several comments by Justice Scalia in Stop the 
Beach put into question whether this principle would have any 
significant weight in reviewing potential ―judicial wrongs.‖231 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a 
factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The appli-
cant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by 
clear and convincing evidence.‖) Notwithstanding, the Court has reserved its 
power to intervene, as ―[a] federal court can disagree with a state court‘s cre-
dibility determination and . . . conclude the decision was unreasonable or that 
the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.‖ Miller-El 
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).  
 227. Monaghan, supra note 224, at 261–62. 
 228. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630 (1874).  
 229. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Deter-
minations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 
1924 (2003) (referring to Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945)). 
 230. Id. (quoting Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. 
Ass‘n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976)).  
 231. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t. of Envtl. Prot., 
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2609–10 (2010). 
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Bush v. Gore,232 one of the Court‘s most contested opinions in 
recent years,233 also implicated the ―fair and substantial basis‖ 
test.234 Stepping in for Florida‘s Supreme Court in determining 
the meaning of Florida‘s election law, the Court practically de-
viated from this principle. This was done in order to review 
(and ultimately agree with) the petitioner‘s argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause imposed a 
duty of fidelity to Florida‘s election law as stated by the legisla-
ture at the time of the election, and that the state court‘s later 
―interpretation‖ of it impermissibly altered the law and thus 
violated that constitutional duty.235 In his concurring opinion, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that ―[t]hough we generally 
defer to state courts on the interpretation of state law . . . there 
are of course areas in which the Constitution requires this 
Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis 
of state law.‖236  
Federal judicial intervention in the determination of state 
law by the state‘s court of last resort, when a change in state 
law could in itself have federal constitutional implications, may 
sound befitting also for the circumstances of the Stop the Beach 
case, or for that matter, for the two hypothetical examples set 
out above. And indeed, although Justice Scalia does not refer to 
Bush v. Gore, he does address the potential implications of the 
plurality‘s opinion on the ―fair and substantial basis‖  
principle.237 
Scalia reasons that ―[t]o assure that there is no ‗evasion‘ of 
our authority to review federal questions, we insist that the 
nonfederal ground of decision have ‗fair support.‘‖238 This 
means, reasons Scalia, ―that there is a ‗fair and substantial ba-
sis‘ for believing that petitioner‘s Members did not have a prop-
erty right to future accretions which the Act would take away. 
This is no different, we think, from our requirement that peti-
                                                                                 
 232. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 233. See Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutio-
nality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 612–18 (2002) (surveying the vari-
ous criticisms). 
 234. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–11. 
 235. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 236. Id. at 112–14.  
 237. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t. of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592, 2608 (2010). This was done in response to respondents‘ argument 
that in a case claiming a judicial taking, the Court should add this principle to 
its normal takings inquiry. Id. 
 238. Id. 
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tioner‘s Members must prove the elimination of an established 
property right.‖239 
In a subsequent footnote, Scalia rejects Justice Breyer‘s 
view that ―we do not set forth ‗procedural limitations or canons 
of deference‘ to restrict federal-court review of state-court prop-
erty decisions.‖240 ―It is true,‖ writes Scalia, ―that we make our 
own determination, without deference to state judges, whether 
the challenged decision deprives the claimant of an established 
property right. That is unsurprising because it is what this 
Court does when determining state-court compliance with all 
constitutional imperatives.‖241 At the same time, he reasons: 
The test we have adopted, however (deprivation of an established 
property right), contains within itself a considerable degree of defe-
rence to state courts. A property right is not established if there is 
doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make 
our own assessment but accept the determination of the state 
court.242 
 This ―restriction‖ does not mean much, however, and it is 
probably no surprise that Scalia does not mention Bush v. Gore, 
in which the Court determined previous state law. Accordingly, 
if it is the state court‘s change of the common law that creates a 
potential constitutional violation, a reviewing federal court has 
no alternative but to determine both what state law has been, 
and what it is following the state judicial action.243 It therefore 
seems clear enough that in reviewing an alleged constitutional 
wrong, resulting from a change to a common law doctrine in-
troduced by the state court, the Court would have to preserve 
the power to independently determine both the former and the 
current state law. This is, therefore, yet another peculiarity 
stemming from the judicial review of judicial lawmaking: when 
the state court itself is suspected of committing a constitutional 
wrong, the federal reviewer could not defer to the ―fair and sub-
stantial basis‖ and to the state court in learning the content of 
the state‘s common law. 
                                                                                 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. at 2608 n.9. 
 241. Id. at 2608–09 n.9. 
 242. Id. at 2609–10 n.9. 
 243. In Stop the Beach, Florida‘s Supreme Court depicted the common law 
right to accretions as a future contingent interest rather than a vested proper-
ty interest; Scalia tries to smooth this gap by saying that this distinction does 
not matter for the takings claim. Id. at 2601 n.5.  
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2. ―Full Faith and Credit‖ in State Judicial Wrongs? 
Another jurisdictional issue, which may entail peculiar 
consequences in the context of judicial lawmaking, is that of 
claim- and issue-preclusion. While this rule generally makes 
sense in preventing repetitive litigation in state and then fed-
eral courts, it creates unique conceptual difficulties when the 
state court of last resort is the body whose actions are those 
that had arguably committed a federal constitutional wrong 
against the plaintiff. 
The source of preclusion is located in Article IV, § 1, of the 
Constitution, under which ―Full Faith and Credit shall be given 
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceed-
ings of every other State.‖244 Congress has codified the prin-
ciple, such that ―judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same 
full faith and credit in every court within the United 
States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State . . . .‖245 These provisions have long been interpreted by 
the Court as encompassing both claim preclusion (res judicata) 
and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).246 
What does this principle mean in the context of federal 
constitutional rights? For most constitutional claims, a litigant 
arguing for an infringement of a constitutional right could elect 
whether to go to a state court or to a federal district court to 
pursue the action.247 The ―Full Faith and Credit‖ principle 
would bar her from relitigating in the other forum the causes of 
action or decided issues.248 Although such an ―either-or‖ ap-
proach may create some difficulties in allocating jurisdiction 
over some disputes and in ensuring that the adjudicating court 
provides parties with a full opportunity to raise their various 
claims,249 ―Full Faith and Credit‖ claim- and issue-preclusion 
serves an important goal of preventing a legal scenario in 
which ―an end could never be put to litigation.‖250 
                                                                                 
 244. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 245. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).  
 246. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336 
(2005).  
 247. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 286 (5th ed. 2007). 
 248. See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 336. 
 249. For a detailed analysis of the allocation of cases between state and 
federal courts, and a criticism of the prevailing ―either-or‖ approach, see Barry 
Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between 
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1216–26 (2004).  
 250. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 336–37.  
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Jurisdictional complexities arise, however, when the reso-
lution of a federal constitutional claim requires an extensive 
inquiry into the relevant state law. Under the abstention rule 
set forth in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., a federal dis-
trict court should stay its hands from a dispute if the federal 
cause of action is embedded in a certain state law question, es-
pecially when resolution of the state law matter could make the 
federal question no longer required.251 In England v. Louisiana 
State Board of Medical Examiners, the Court held that if the 
state law adjudication has not resolved the federal law ques-
tions, the litigant could then return to the federal court to pur-
sue the matter.252 But as is often the case, the state court will 
also address and decide federal constitutional law issues if ei-
ther of the parties raise them.253 The plaintiff could then be 
barred from ever introducing the federal questions to, and hav-
ing them decided by, a federal district court.254 
One area in which a combination of abstention, ripeness, 
and preclusion rules has led to the practical result of a federal 
constitutional claim never making it to a federal district court, 
is that of a ―regulatory takings‖ claim. In Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, the Court held that a regulatory taking claim is generally 
―unripe‖ for federal review until the plaintiff seeks both (1) a 
final decision by the governmental agency, and (2) payment of 
―Just Compensation‖ for the taking under available state law 
and procedure.255  
In San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, the plain-
tiff attacked a city ordinance reclassifying a hotel as for resi-
dential use only—as both a facial and ―as-applied‖ taking, as 
well as a violation of substantive due process.256 After the fed-
eral district court held that the federal causes of action were 
either unripe under Williamson County or barred by the sta-
tute of limitations in the case of the facial-taking claim, the 
state court found for the defendants.257 The petitioner‘s attempt 
to return to the federal court to litigate the federal questions 
was then blocked.258 The Court held that only the facial-taking 
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claim was ripe for federal review under Williamson County, but 
that the plaintiff had then voluntarily raised it before the state 
court so that it became precluded.259 As for the other federal 
claims, which were viewed as initially unripe for federal district 
review and then decided by the California courts, the Court 
held that ―even when the plaintiff would have preferred not to 
litigate in state court, but was required to do so by a statute or 
prudential rules,‖ then ―issues actually decided in valid state-
court judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the ‗right‘ to 
have their federal claims relitigated in federal court.‖260 
The Court refused to carve out an exception to the claim- 
and issue-preclusion, even though the plaintiff was initially 
prevented from electing to litigate its federal law claims in a 
federal district court because its regulatory-takings claim was 
unripe under Williamson County.261 According to the plurality 
opinion,  
It is hardly a radical notion to recognize that, as a practical matter, a 
significant number of plaintiffs will necessarily litigate their federal 
takings claims in state courts . . . . State courts are fully competent to 
adjudicate constitutional challenges to local land-use decisions. In-
deed, state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal 
courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal ques-
tions related to zoning and land-use regulation.262 
The plurality thus gives, in the context of this case, an en-
thusiastic positive answer to the question of parity, i.e., 
―whether, overall, state courts are equal to federal courts in 
their ability and willingness to protect federal rights.‖263 This 
conclusion, however, is debatable.264  
                                                                                 
 259. Id. at 340–41. 
 260. Id. at 342.  
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But whatever the general inclinations about parity, the 
context of state judicial lawmaking creates a clear paradox. On 
the one hand, entrusting the state court with deciding federal 
constitutional claims against its own rulemaking seems simply 
self-contradictory. Since courts, unlike the legislature or the 
executive, have no ―purse,‖ they would probably never admit to 
effecting a taking, or to committing some other constitutional 
wrong that could immediately undermine their own legitima-
cy.265 From this perspective, while state courts have lawmaking 
powers, and otherwise have power to review the constitutional-
ity of government actions, they obviously cannot exercise both 
powers at the same time.266 State judicial lawmaking might 
therefore seem the paradigmatic case for granting federal 
courts broad jurisdiction to guard against constitutional 
wrongs.  
But on the other hand, opting for the other conventional al-
ternative—federal district court jurisdiction—might also prove 
awkward. Assume a case in which a judicial reform in a certain 
common law doctrine is first made by a state‘s trial court, and 
the losing party argues that this judicial lawmaking results in 
a certain constitutional wrong. Should the plaintiff be allowed 
to now take the case immediately to a federal district court to 
review her federal constitutional claim? Does it not make much 
more sense to have superior state courts, up to the state court 
of last resort, review this piece of state judicial lawmaking on a 
state common law doctrine, before it is turned over to federal 
jurisdiction? Would not an approach of state-federal ―zigzag‖ 
jurisdiction undermine the entire structure of the state court 
system and the tiered system of appellate review?  
What about a third option, by which the case would go all 
the way up to the state court of last resort, and only then be 
steered to a federal district court? This runs the risk of violat-
ing issue- and claim-preclusion rules not only technically, be-
cause the plaintiff would rarely be able or inclined to disregard 
federal law questions in the state courts, but also normatively, 
because it undermines the very basic idea of ―Full Faith and 
Credit,‖ that prevents scenarios in which ―an end could never 
be put to litigation.‖267 
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At the same time, the solution we are left with as a matter 
of default—that all cases of judicial lawmaking by state courts 
of last resort are reviewed, if at all, only by the U.S. Supreme 
Court under its power to issue a writ of certiorari268—raises in 
itself some difficult dilemmas, which I touch on briefly below. 
3. The ―Error-Correction‖ Role of Certiorari  
Assume that federal constitutional challenges to judicial 
lawmaking by state courts of last resort would indeed require a 
writ of certiorari by the Court. How would the Court‘s policy on 
the matter be different from its issuance of similar writs, when 
legislative or administrative lawmaking is challenged on simi-
lar grounds and the matter has then been litigated by the state 
court of last resort? Once again, I focus attention on traditional 
common law doctrines that arguably implicate a ―governmental 
wrong.‖ Probably unsurprisingly, the Court‘s review of state 
judicial lawmaking poses a genuine puzzle that does not sit com-
fortably with the Court‘s broader policy on the role of certiorari. 
The Court‘s policy on exercising its ―error-correction‖ func-
tion by issuing writs of certiorari is articulated in Rule 10 of the 
Supreme Court Rules.269 Under Rule 10(c), a writ can be issued 
when ―a state . . . court has decided an important question of 
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this 
Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way 
that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.‖270 At the 
same time, Rule 10‘s concluding section provides that ―[a] peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted 
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplica-
tion of a properly stated rule of law.‖271 
This latter provision is understood to reflect a policy by 
which the Court is ―less concerned about rectifying isolated er-
rors in the lower courts,‖ believing ―that a relatively small 
number of nationally binding precedents is sufficient to provide 
doctrinal guidance for the resolution of recurring issues.‖272 The 
underlying assumption is that state courts of last resort can be 
generally trusted with implementing the broad principles laid 
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down by the Court, so that even if the fifty states will not reach 
ultimate harmony in every single case, a satisfactory level of 
uniformity will be maintained in applying federal law prin-
ciples, including when these become entangled with specific 
state law questions.273  
How would this working assumption fare in the case of a 
state judicial wrong? On the one hand, opening every potential 
state court dispute to a review by the Court, in contrast to the 
otherwise contractive approach of granting writs of certiorari, 
runs the risk of gate flooding, as Justice Breyer suggested in 
his concurring opinion in Stop the Beach.274 
Moreover, as a normative matter, it is debatable what de-
gree of harmonization is really required at the state level, espe-
cially when the cases involve traditional common law doctrines. 
To the extent that Erie‘s rule that ―there is no federal common 
law‖275 reflects a federalist principle by which common law 
matters are better left for the states, one might argue that even 
if these doctrines involve federal law questions, there should be 
room for greater discretion to state courts of last resort in de-
veloping these doctrines. 
But, on the other hand, if the state court of last resort is it-
self the potential wrongdoer under the Federal Constitution, 
would not the Court, in refusing to accept cases whose potential 
errors consist of ―erroneous factual findings or the misapplica-
tion of a properly stated rule of law‖276 simply turn a blind eye 
to potential constitutional wrongs? Even if we otherwise view 
state courts of last resort as reliable guardians who would de-
fend federal constitutional rights when these rights are in-
fringed by state legislative and administrative bodies—who will 
guard the guardians when the state court of last resort engages 
in judicial lawmaking in a common law doctrine, but in so 
doing deprives an individual of a federal constitutional right 
and misapplies the Court‘s created rules of law? 
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C. THE CIRCULARITY OF DELINEATING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 
The range of issues analyzed in Sections A and B leads to 
the conclusion that once the full scope of ―judicial wrongs‖ is 
induced from the emerging concept of the ―judicial taking‖ doc-
trine, any attempt to neatly define the nature and scope of 
―judicial review of judicial lawmaking‖ would basically turn in-
to a vicious cycle.  
Throughout the history of the common law, courts have 
been able to manage the delicate task of being both objective 
adjudicators who protect individuals from violation of rights by 
the government and state actors that engage in lawmaking.277 
But once the conflict of interests deriving from this Janus-faced 
nature of courts is allegedly exposed, then defining the scope of 
judicial review of judicial lawmaking, without entirely collaps-
ing the fundamental role of courts in the legal system, becomes 
a highly frustrating endeavor.  
My guess is that some of the tautologies and institutional 
quagmires described in the above Sections, which relate to 
more functional and technical aspects of the work of state and 
federal courts, could be generally resolved, even if not perfectly. 
One could assume that, over time, if the concept of a ―judicial 
constitutional wrong‖ becomes a prevailing notion as an inevit-
able extension of the ―judicial taking‖ doctrine, then the Court 
could come up with some adjustments for claim- and issue pre-
clusion, or for evaluating its own discretionary power of grant-
ing certiorari, so as to reach a generally workable framework.  
But the most pressing and troubling issue of circularity, 
from a normative standpoint, is the one implicating the politi-
cal and institutional legitimacy of courts. The entire structure 
of government and the constitutional system is built on the un-
derlying concept by which the political branches—the legisla-
ture and the executive—are the bodies entrusted with the onus 
of legal norm making.278 As such, these bodies enjoy a substan-
tial amount of deference in making policy choices and in trans-
forming social values into legal rights and duties.279 Recall Jus-
tice O‘Connor‘s statement in Lingle against expanding the 
scope of the ―substantively advances‖ test, because this ―would 
require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state 
                                                                                 
 277. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, at 2; Schauer, supra note 36, at 
886–88. 
 278. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 1; id. art. II, §§ 2–3. 
 279. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994). 
 2011] JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 571 
 
and federal regulation—a task for which courts are not well 
suited.‖280 But where does this statement leave us when judi-
cial lawmaking in a certain common law doctrine is at stake? 
Does it necessarily come down to a jurisprudential dead end, by 
which the judicial lawmaker must be deferred to because it is a 
lawmaker but it cannot be deferred to because it is a court? 
The reason that we grant power to courts to assess, and at 
times invalidate, the lawmaking products of legislatures and 
administrators is because courts are conceived in this context 
to be objective guardians, who are willing and able to enforce 
constitutional rights against the popular will.281 But what hap-
pens when a lawmaking court assumes the role of government? 
Can it still be trusted not to overlook individual rights in pro-
moting a broad-based social policy? Or has it now turned into a 
full-fledged arm of government that loses its legitimacy as a 
guardian?  
These problems can probably never be resolved fully and 
hermetically. But in order to alleviate these difficulties so that 
they do not entirely undermine the judiciary and the system of 
government more generally, one needs to develop a general 
theory of the democratic legitimacy of courts to engage in law-
making and of the corresponding division of labor among Gov-
ernment‘s different branches. Although these issues are perti-
nent to all fields of law, I focus attention again on traditional 
common law doctrines. It is within this realm that Part IV sug-
gests a tentative framework for a legitimization of judicial 
lawmaking, while addressing the potential problem of judicial 
wrongs.  
IV.  SCALING DOWN THE CONCEPT OF  
JUDICIAL WRONGS   
In this Part, I argue that, at least as far as common law 
doctrines are concerned, we can articulate a model of political 
legitimacy for courts to engage in lawmaking. While such a 
model does not serve as a panacea for all issues pertaining to 
the allocation of powers among the different branches of gov-
ernment, it does serve the purpose of significantly scaling down 
the potential peculiarities of ―judicial wrongs‖ jurisprudence. It 
is important to note that this model does not purport to depict 
the historical evolution of the division of labor among legisla-
tures and courts in the Anglo-American system, but to suggest 
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a contemporary model that would entrench the political legiti-
macy of courts.  
The suggested model does so by attributing the power of 
courts to engage in lawmaking to an implicit mandate by the 
political branches, such power going beyond the otherwise well-
established authority of courts to engage in dispute resolution. 
This type of mandate is especially entrenched when legisla-
tures and administrative agencies, acting in the ―age of sta-
tutes,‖282 promulgate norms that govern a certain field of com-
mon law, but at the same time, these norms are designed as 
relatively vague or otherwise open-ended.  
As I explain below, such ―legal standards‖ should be seen 
as delegating authority to courts to fill the norms with thicker 
content over time, while at the same time maintaining the orig-
inal attribution of the legal ordering to the relevant political 
branch. In so doing, the model works to better conceptualize 
most potential cases of ―judicial wrongs‖ as more conventional 
―governmental wrongs‖ that should be reviewed by the Court 
along its traditional lines of jurisprudence. Even in the in-
stances in which a particular piece of judicial lawmaking does 
not fit comfortably within such a conceptualization, the basic 
tenets of the model alleviate much of the institutional quag-
mires and circular reasoning that could haunt judicial review of 
judicial lawmaking in the aftermath of Stop the Beach.  
A. LEGISLATIVE RULES AND STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL 
LAWMAKING  
The rules-versus-standards debate has been one of the foc-
al points of the contemporary discourse on form and substance 
in jurisprudence.283 As I have shown elsewhere, much of this 
new theoretical discussion does not seek to consecrate either 
hard-edged ―rules‖ or open-ended ―standards‖ as inherently su-
perior.284 The discussion portrays the comparative advantages 
of rules and standards as contingent on the empirical or sys-
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temic tradeoff of social costs and benefits accruing to both deci-
sion makers and the recipients of the legal norms.285  
In one such prominent work, Louis Kaplow looks at this 
potential tradeoff for public decision makers, by evaluating fac-
tors such as information costs or the frequency and probability 
that a dispute will arise.286 According to Kaplow, rules are more 
costly to enact than standards, because rules involve extensive, 
up-front, and elaborate determinations of the law‘s content.287 
However, vague standards create higher costs during the im-
plementation and enforcement stages: parties and their legal 
advisers take pains to predict potential outcomes, and courts 
must engage in a more detailed ex post inquiry to decide the 
law in specific disputes.288 Studies along similar veins have also 
been done with respect to private forms of lawmaking, mainly 
the formulation of contracts.289  
A central assumption in this literature is that even if we 
consider clear-cut, up-front legislative rules to be superior, this 
goal cannot always be attained. Every field of private law (or 
public law, for that matter) has an inherent feature of incom-
pleteness. Even the most prudent legislature cannot anticipate 
and regulate in advance all contingencies and scenarios that 
may arise with respect to a certain norm. Thus, property, con-
tract, tort, and unjust enrichment statutes will always remain 
incomplete to some extent.290  
Under this conceptual framework of incompleteness, rules 
are understood as legal provisions that are more exhaustive 
than standards not only in the sense that they are initially 
phrased in more concrete clear-cut terms, but also in the sense 
that dispute resolution in regard thereto should focus on ―a 
more limited set of authoritative or evidentiary materials,‖291 
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like the specific wording of a given statute or contract. Alterna-
tively, standards are understood as initially vague norms, given 
content during extensive ex post judicial inquiry.292 
The debate over the appropriate design of legal norms, es-
pecially to the extent that that debate implicates the level of 
discretion awarded to courts during adjudication, has not fo-
cused solely on consequentialist considerations. It also centers 
upon several arguments that have become especially prominent 
since the emergence of legal realism. According to the realist 
view, the legal system should embrace a ―substantive‖ ap-
proach to law—one that always looks to connect the application 
of legal norms to the societal values and goals underlying the 
norms.293 Under an aggressive version of this realist approach, 
vagueness is considered inherently good, because it enables 
courts to engage in highly detailed, ―situation-sense‖ adjudica-
tion.294 But more contemporary approaches that are sympathe-
tic to substantive jurisprudence nevertheless try to toe the fine 
line between ―norm-sensitivity‖—by which the application of 
rules must have some regard to their normative justification to 
avoid arbitrary and unjust results—and avoiding the dangers 
of excessive ―context-sensitivity‖ that would deprive law of its 
essential planning function.295 My suggested conceptualization 
of legal rules and standards seeks to integrate the functional 
incompleteness of up-front legislative norms with a limited de-
gree of substance-oriented jurisprudence, by focusing on the 
institutional structure of a legal standard. I thus define a stan-
dard as a legal provision that delegates the giving of fuller 
norm-content to decision-making bodies other than the original 
standard-setter.  
In the context of this Article, this means that in the era of 
the contemporary administrative State, when legislation or 
administrative regulation is made in a certain field of common 
law, a choice to enact certain legal standards, or to leave unco-
vered a significant number of relevant issues within this field, 
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entails a delegation of authority to courts to engage in a dy-
namic process of giving or adding content to these standards.  
Such a process does not, however, require that the legal 
standard remain vague all the way down to a judicial case-
specific inquiry. In many cases, the opposite would be true. Be-
cause no single field of common law could function properly 
without ensuring a sufficient amount of stability, predictability, 
and guidance, courts are compelled to refrain from engaging in 
ad hoc jurisprudence. Nevertheless, legislative delegation of the 
sort mentioned authorizes, and actually requires, courts to en-
gage in a certain level of judicial lawmaking. The process by 
which courts give content to legal standards not only clarifies to 
the instant parties what the law is on a certain point, but also 
creates a broader understanding of the legal norm and its ap-
plication within the general field of law. Seen this way, judicial 
lawmaking is not only a possible result of such a delegation—it 
is often its inevitable purpose.  
A prominent example of the promulgation of legal stan-
dards in state common law is found in the different states‘ ver-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, which include provi-
sions such as ―commercial standards‖ and ―usages of trade.‖296 
Perhaps the most notable standard in this context is that of 
―good faith.‖297 Under Article 2 of the U.C.C., which applies to 
merchants, ―good faith,‖ is defined as ―honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing 
in the trade.‖298 The latter part of this definition imposes an 
objective good faith requirement that goes beyond the subjec-
tive good faith embedded in ―honesty in fact.‖299 In 2001, the 
ALI expanded the U.C.C.‘s general Article 1 definition of ―good 
faith‖ beyond simple ―honesty in fact‖ to include the objective 
good faith component used under Article 2.300 This revision of 
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the U.C.C. therefore extends the broader definition of good 
faith to dealings involving non-merchants.301  
This expansion of the scope of the good faith requirement 
has led to mixed responses: some states have amended their 
legislation in accordance with the U.C.C. revisions302 while oth-
ers have refused to apply this additional objective standard to 
non-merchants.303 I argue that the choice made by each state 
legislature reflects not only a particular policy decision as to 
whether non-merchants should be exposed to the same kind of 
duties as merchants, but also a choice as to the appropriate 
scope of the lawmaking mandate awarded to the state court for 
purposes of developing this facet of private law. Entrusting 
courts with the task of giving content to such a norm goes 
beyond resolving specific disputes. In fact, it requires courts to 
engage in lawmaking by delineating the broad contours of hu-
man conduct in everyday commercial dealings.  
In addition to the promulgation of standards, legislatures 
also mandate judicial lawmaking when they leave uncovered a 
significant portion of the relevant issues within an otherwise-
legislated field of law. The doctrine of adverse possession, in-
troduced in Part III.A.1, illustrates, and is perhaps the quin-
tessential example of, just such mandate granting. When one 
looks at the development of this common law doctrine over cen-
turies, it becomes clear not only that the law of adverse posses-
sion is in practice a combination of statutory and case law, but 
also that it reflects a conscious decision by the legislatures to 
leave some significant portions of the doctrine to judicial law-
making.304 
The doctrine originally evolved from judicial decisions re-
solving disputes over the application of a general statute of li-
mitations, providing for a certain period of years after which 
claims became barred.305 The doctrine has since developed way 
beyond that initially limited scope. For instance, the doctrine 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11, 40–43 (2007). 
 301. See U.C.C. § 1–304 (2004) (―Every contract or duty within [the Uni-
form Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance 
and enforcement.‖). 
 302. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.01.211(b)(22) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 42a-1-201(b)(20) (2005). 
 303. See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(19) (West 2007); FLA. STAT.  
§ 671.210(19) (2004); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 1–201(19) (McKinney 2001). 
 304. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 120. 
 305. See Stake, supra note 200, at 2421–22 (noting that the relevant claim 
limited by the statute has been an action in ejectment). 
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now goes beyond claim immunity to grant adverse possessors 
the positive right to take title to land.306 Additionally the courts 
have expanded the nature of the adverse possession doctrine by 
articulating numerous additional elements that the adverse 
possessor must satisfy for the doctrine to apply. These elements 
include entry that creates a cause of action, ―open and noto-
rious‖ possession, that is ―continuous for the statutory period,‖ 
as well as ―adverse and under a claim of title.‖307 The latter 
element has been especially endowed with a thick layer of legal 
policy, often leading to highly diverging opinions among differ-
ent state courts.308 
The development of this entire array of law has thus been 
left to the courts. Even though legislatures have often amended 
the relevant period of years for introducing real property claims 
through their general statutes of limitations309—meaning that 
legislatures have kept pace with the doctrine so that the legis-
lation has not simply remained untouched and anachronis-
tic310—legislatures have nevertheless left it generally to courts 
to continue engaging in lawmaking as pertains to the above-
mentioned components of the common-law doctrine.311 
This does not mean that the mandate to courts to engage in 
lawmaking is unlimited. Unlike the court‘s independent func-
tion to resolve specific disputes brought before it, legislatures 
and administrative agencies can trump or truncate the 
mandate for judicial lawmaking by deciding to amend or crys-
tallize the underlying legal norms of a certain area of the law. 
They may even do so as a response to a certain act of judicial 
lawmaking. This should be uncontroversial even for supporters 
of broad powers of judicial lawmaking. In the common law, the 
 
                                                                                 
 306. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 116. 
 307. Id. at 120–22.  
 308. See id. at 131–35. 
309.Stake, supra note 200, at 2421 n.11. 
 310. Id. 
 311. I therefore disagree with Duncan Kennedy‘s argument that under a 
regime of legal standards, courts would engage in ―sub rosa lawmaking.‖ Dun-
can Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1690 (1976). Judicial lawmaking in these circumstances is not se-
cret or subversive. It is rather a necessary process to fill initially vague norms 
with content in a comprehensive and transparent fashion. It is a much clearer 
and more straightforward process of developing the law than is the case when 
a court uses the standard‘s vagueness as an excuse for uncontrolled ad hoc 
jurisprudence.  
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political branches generally have the final say about law‘s  
content.  
The suggested model breaks rank from Guido Calabresi‘s 
thesis about the role of the courts in an ―age of statutes.‖312 Cal-
abresi argues that the common law function of courts today ―is 
no more and no less than the critical task of deciding when a 
retentionist or a revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an 
existing statutory or common law rule.‖313 According to Cala-
bresi, courts should thus exercise a judgmental function of de-
ciding when a rule ―has come to be sufficiently out of phase 
with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can 
only stand if a current majoritarian or representative body 
reaffirms it.‖314  
In one way, this role strives for too little: it assigns courts 
only with the negative task of guarding against anachronism or 
blunt incoherence, rather than also with some positive power to 
engage in developing the law. In many other ways, however, 
Calabresi‘s approach grants courts an almost unbounded dis-
cretion, by allowing courts to take remedial action not only 
through the promulgation of a norm, but also through the use 
of ―techniques designed to influence the legislative and even 
the administrative agendas.‖315 His model locates courts in an 
adversarial position vis-à-vis the legislature or administrative 
agency in the development of the common law. It requires 
courts to engage in perpetual second-guessing of the other 
branches‘ overall structuring, or ―legal framework,‖ of the 
common law.  
In contrast, the suggested delegation model promoted here 
is one of collaboration. It allows the legislature to entrust the 
court with the role of lawmaking, by adopting a strategy of 
promulgating certain norms as standards or to leave certain 
issues within a legal field as more appropriate for judicial de-
velopment. Furthermore it always allows the legislature (sub-
ject to the court‘s otherwise-based power of constitutional re-
view) to update or truncate such mandate by introducing a new 
piece of legislation or regulation.316  
                                                                                 
 312. CALABRESI, supra note 98. 
 313. Id. at 164. 
 314. Id.  
 315. Id.  
 316. Calabresi also purports to avoid ―depriving popular or representative 
bodies of their last say.‖ Id. at 164–65. Unlike the suggested delegation model, 
however, Calabresi‘s model places the preserved role of the legislature square-
ly within an adversarial framework that pits judiciary against legislature. Id. 
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B. THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE MODEL AND ―JUDICIAL 
WRONGS‖ 
The outlined delegation model could play an important role 
in scaling down the potential superfluous effects of judicial 
wrongs jurisprudence. The implicit delegation of authority by 
the legislative and executive branches to courts to engage in 
judicial lawmaking pursuant to initially vague or lacking com-
mon law legislation preserves the original attribution of law-
making to these political branches. This means that, when the 
Court assesses the potential infringement of federal constitu-
tional rights by judicial lawmaking, the original motives, core 
policies, and accountability for policy- and law-making would 
generally be attributed to the underlying statutory or executive 
act. 
Accordingly, the vast majority of cases that might be de-
picted in the aftermath of Stop the Beach as ―judicial lawmak-
ing wrongs‖ could and should be reconceptualized as more con-
ventional ―governmental wrongs.‖ Such potential violations of 
constitutional rights should thus be evaluated by the Court 
along its traditional lines of judicial review. Instead of referring 
to the state court as a self-standing policymaker, and in so 
doing becoming entangled in the institutional quagmires por-
trayed in Part III, the Court should look to the underlying sta-
tutory or executive act as the source of the contested norm. 
The idea here is neither to delineate some simplistic ―vicar-
ious liability‖ model, nor to engage in ancillary issues such as 
the potential expansion of the nondelegation doctrine as a con-
stitutional or institutional limit on judicial lawmaking.317 It is 
rather intended to locate judicial lawmaking in a more genuine 
and realistic framework of understanding the role of courts in 
the era of the modern administrative State, rather than being 
tempted to follow the allegedly natural trajectory of the post-
Stop the Beach jurisprudence. 
What is probably most striking in this respect is the fact 
that the Stop the Beach case in itself is not really a ―judicial 
taking‖ case. What the Florida Supreme Court did, following 
the certification of the question ―does the Beach and Shore Pre-
                                                                                 
 317. For the latter idea, see Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judi-
cially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 405, 421–43 (2008) (discussing the nondelegation doctrine which has 
somewhat limited, even if in a declining fashion, Congress‘s ability to delegate 
lawmaking authority to the executive and arguing that the doctrine‘s underly-
ing ideas could apply at times to the federal judiciary).  
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servation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of litto-
ral rights without just compensation?,‖ was to examine the 
Florida legislature‘s Act, and to answer whether the Act ad-
versely affected previously existing common law property 
rights so as to result in a taking.318  
This is exactly what the Florida Supreme Court did. It rea-
soned that that the legal regime applying to restoration and 
renourishment projects conformed to the common law principle 
of avulsion.319 Moreover, the legislature had demonstrated an 
awareness of the background of existing common law rules 
against which it acted by providing that landowners would con-
tinue to be entitled ―to all common-law riparian rights‖ except 
for the right to accretions.320 So even if the U.S. Supreme Court 
were to come to the conclusion that the Act violated the Tak-
ings Clause, so that the Florida Supreme Court was wrong, the 
Court should have attributed the motives and underlying policy 
choices to Florida‘s political branch, while independently as-
sessing the federal law questions.321  
Such attribution would make perfect sense, for purposes of 
federal judicial review, in many other contexts that could have 
hypothetically been depicted as judicial-wrong cases in the af-
termath of Stop the Beach. Going back to the adverse posses-
sion example, a depiction of the ―continuous possession‖ reform 
as a judicial act entirely detached from the doctrine‘s legislative 
background would in itself be detached from legal reality. The 
development of the doctrine over centuries as a mixture of sta-
tutes and case law reveals a scheme of institutional collabora-
tion.322 If the legislature were to think that the state court went 
overboard in its most recent development of the doctrine, it 
could always revise it and provide guidance for future judicial 
lawmaking by using the rule-standard strategy. 
Thus, for purposes of identifying the underlying motives, 
goals, and background socioeconomic facts, a federal reviewing 
                                                                                 
 318. See Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 
1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008). 
 319. Id. at 1114–15. 
 320. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§161.011–.45 (West 2006).  
 321. One could speculate as to why the case was initially presented to the 
Court as a judicial-taking case. It is possible that presenting the case in such 
an innovative fashion increased the likelihood that the Court would issue a 
writ of certiorari, that the petitioner hoped that the Court would scrutinize the 
Florida Supreme Court‘s decision more stringently than if it were a regular 
―appeal,‖ or that there were potential hurdles in asserting a facial-takings 
claim due to the potential application of the statute of limitations.  
 322. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 120. 
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court could rely on the way in which the institutional collabora-
tive scheme has unfolded over time, while independently re-
viewing the federal law questions implicated by the develop-
ment of the common law doctrine.  
More generally, the difficulties that often exist in drawing 
the lines between ―statutory interpretation‖ and ―judicial law-
making‖—a problem that has otherwise troubled decision mak-
ers and commentators dealing with the legitimacy and institu-
tional competence of courts to innovate—would not adversely 
affect the suggest model.323 Quite the contrary: since under 
both scenarios, attribution of the original lawmaking would be 
made, for purposes of federal review, to the political branch, 
state courts would have few incentives to purposely manipulate 
the nature of their decisions. 
My intention in suggesting the delegation model for under-
standing judicial lawmaking is not to depict courts as ―angels,‖ 
capable of doing no wrong. As I have stated in the Introduction, 
there are enough cases in which the state judiciary should be 
held solely responsible for infringing litigants‘ constitutional 
rights. Judicial lawmaking, however, for the reasons set forth 
above and especially in the context of common law doctrines, 
represents an entirely different case. 
My suggested approach does not purport to eliminate the 
possibility of a judicial wrong scenario altogether. It would, 
however, definitely scale it down, not only quantitatively, but 
also, and perhaps even more so, qualitatively. The suggested 
model would significantly ease the tension inherent in the po-
tential undermining of the nature and structure of the judicial 
branch that may follow as an unintended result of Stop the 
Beach. It not only maintains judicial integrity, but also 
attributes the origin of lawmaking to its natural locus: the po-
litical branches.  
  CONCLUSION   
The Stop the Beach case is more than just another takings 
case in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, and potentially impli-
cates the conception of the balance of governmental power and 
the proper role of courts in the process of rule-making in the 
age of the modern administrative State. Whichever opinion is 
                                                                                 
 323. See, e.g., Barak, supra note 41, at 46–53; Fallon, supra note 1, at 
1813–27, 1842–47; Scalia, supra note 35, at 9–18; Schauer, supra note 36, at 
906–17; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 920–32 (2003).  
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deemed more convincing—Scalia‘s introduction of the judicial 
taking doctrine, Kennedy‘s application of substantive due 
process for judicial ―dramatic‖ innovation, or Breyer‘s ―better 
left for another day‖ approach—the case seems to have exposed 
an open nerve in the American legal system. It allegedly un-
veils the trickery of state courts: that objective adjudicators 
could engage in a violation of federal constitutional rights while 
encroaching upon the lawmaking domains that are within the 
province of the political branches. This possibility allegedly ne-
cessitates the creation of a new body of jurisprudence that con-
ceptualizes and delineates the federal judicial review of state 
judicial lawmaking. 
Such a viewpoint, however, is twisted. On the one hand, it 
simply ignores the way in which laws, and especially common 
law doctrines, have developed over the course of centuries, in-
cluding during the era of the contemporary administrative 
State. Courts do not operate in hiding or need to engage in sub-
terfuge to make law in these fields. On the other hand, it de-
picts courts as acting free of any constraints even though state 
judicial lawmaking must conform to rights and duties under 
the Federal Constitution and does not take place within a va-
cuum. At least as far as common law doctrines are concerned, 
courts‘ lawmaking power, which exists alongside their inde-
pendent dispute-resolution authority, is based on a collabora-
tive scheme with the other branches of government. That pow-
er, however, while legitimate under the proper legal framework 
and an indispensible aspect of the contextualization process of 
legal standards and norms, eventually yields to legislative su-
premacy in law- and policy-making.  
It would thus be a grave mistake to demonize courts for 
developing the law, or, on the other hand, to release them from 
any constraints in exercising their power. Fortunately, the so-
lution to the host of institutional quagmires and conceptual 
tautologies that the confused Stop the Beach decision might 
have invoked lies within the well-established principles of the 
American legal system. 
In particular, the jurisprudential approach advanced in 
this Article, by which the problem of ―federal judicial review of 
state judicial wrongs‖ could generally be resolved by viewing 
judicial lawmaking as premised on a broad but not unlimited 
delegation of authority by the political branches, would largely 
mitigate the danger of undermining the nature and structure of 
the judicial branch. It would strengthen collaboration among 
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the different branches of government within each state system, 
and make better sense of the federal structure and the inter-
pretation of federal constitutional rights. In so doing, the legal 
system would be better able to address the constant need for 
progress in law in the modern administrative State, while min-
imizing unintended implications that may undermine the del-
icate balance and power-sharing among the three branches of 
the Government. 
